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Recent researches shed light on the information role of major customers of the supplier firms 
on a variety of users, including shareholders (Dhaliwal et al., 2016), debtholders (Campello 
and Gao, 2017) and analysts (Guan et al, 2015). However, scarce researches are developed to 
address the influences of major customers information on corporate managers’ and auditors’ 
decision-making.  
 
My thesis is composed of two essays. The first essay examines if characteristics in terms of 
length (the layers of intermediaries in the supply chain) and width (customer concentration) 
influence the extent of responsiveness in adjusting corporate capacity. Using a sample of 
non-financial U.S. firms between 1978 and 2012, I find that channel length is negatively 
associated with cost responsiveness, which is consistent with the notion that the longer the 
length, the greater the demand signal noises that hinder firms from making capacity planning. 
In addition, I also find a negative association between channel width and cost responses, 
which is consistent with the argument that the greater the concentration ratio, the greater 
relationship specific investment, which leads to lower cost responsiveness. Overall, the 
findings help us to understand how capacity is influenced by supply chain variations. 
 
The second essay examine if the industry homogeneity of audit clients and their major 
customers influence auditors in performing the audit risk assessments and the associated audit 
procedures. Using a sample of U.S. firms between 2002 and 2012, I find that auditors could 
exert less efforts on engagements in which audit clients and their major customers are in the 
same industry. However, the willing to share the cost savings to audit clients depends on the 
positioning of the auditor. Particularly, I find that industry expert auditors do not undercut 
audit fee as a result of cost reductions. These pieces of findings deepen our understanding of 
the audit pricing behaviors.  
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PART I INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 There is a growing interest on the importance of corporate disclosure on its 
major customers. Previous research document that understanding variations in supply 
chain enables various stakeholders to make informed decisions. Despite this, little is 
known about how other users infer firm-specific characteristics (e.g. demand 
uncertainty and risk characteristics) from firms’ disclosure on their principal 
customers. For example, scarce research is done to address how supply chain 
information helps internal and external users in formulating action plans (e.g. 
capacity planning and audit planning). Understanding this could help us know more 




1. Introduction  
 The effect of supply chain variations has recently attracted the attentions of 
accounting researchers. Extant studies infer the supply chain characteristics from 
corporate disclosure on firms’ principal customers, hereafter is called major customer 
disclosure, to examine how information can assist market constituents in making 
decisions (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2016; Campello and Gao, 2017; Guan et al., 2015). 
Despite this, scarce research examine their research questions in a holistic way as 
they focus on a single dimension of supply chain variations, which is the width of 
supply chain, and ignore other potential variations. My thesis is therefore developed 
to examine how decisions could be influenced by channel characteristics in corporate 
and auditing context respectively.  
 Supply chain characteristics could be broadly classified into channel width and 
channel length. The former refers to the extent to which a firm’s revenue is relied on 
a narrow base of customers, hereafter is called customer concentration. For example, 
a firm derived its revenue from a concentrated (diversified) base of customer is 
described to have a narrower (wider) width. The latter refers to the number of layers 
of intermediaries involved in a supply chain channel. For instance, a firms with many 





2. The importance of supply chain variations 
A line of research documents the pros and cons of sourcing strategies (e.g., 
Patatoukas, 2011; Irvine et al., 2016). Based on the identity of principal customers 
and their respective sales amount disclosed, the width of the supply chain could be 
ascertained (also called customer concentration ratio)1. Since then, a growing number 
of research investigate the information role of major customer disclosure from the 
perspectives of analysts, debtholders, shareholders and managers. First, it enables 
market analysts to make an informed forecasts decision. For example, Guan et al. 
(2015) document that financial analysts are more likely to follow covered firms’ 
principal customers if they are relatively important sales. As analysts follow the 
covered firms and customer firms jointly, they are in better capacity to ascertain their 
financial stability and solvency risks. As such, they are able to make informed stock 
recommendations and make less forecast errors.  
Second, it enables debtholders and shareholders to make informed investment 
decisions based on the firm-specific concentration risks. For example, Campello and 
Gao (2017) find that a stricter loan term is imposed on the borrowers who are highly 
concentrated to their principal customers. A higher loan spread is also imposed on 
                                                     
1 According to the Financial Accounting Standard Board, firms are required to report the identity of 
its principal customers as well as the sales amount if its sales accounts for more than 10% of its total 




concentrated borrowers to compensate for higher concentration risks. In addition, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2016) find that the cost of equity capital increases with customer 
concentration. Third, it helps users to assess various aspects of firm performance, 
including management efficiency and profitability. For example, Patatoukas (2012) 
find that firms with concentrated customer base are more profitable and efficient in 
managing their working capital as they are able to obtain private information from 
customer firms. 
[INSERT TABLE ONE HERE] 
 
Therefore, supply chain variations are practically important to us. However, 
little is known about the implications of other dimensions of the supply chain, 
including “the dynamics of upstream and downstream” (Patatoukas , 2012, p.388) 





3. Thesis content 
My thesis is composed of two essays in addressing the implications of supply 
chain variations from managers and auditors perspectives. In the first essay (Chapter 
2), I examine if characteristics in terms of length and width of the supply chain 
influence the extent of responsiveness in adjusting corporate capacity (also called the 
SG&A elasticity). The findings show that firms with longer layers adjust the capacity 
less responsively, revealing that they are more difficult to digest the demand signal 
noises contained in the inbound order. In addition, firms with concentrated customer 
base have lower cost responsiveness, suggesting that they have an incentive to 
recoup the relation specific investment. Taken together, this supports my premise that 
capacity adjustment is a deliberate managerial decision in which constraints and 
incentives have to be considered.  
In the second essay (Chapter 3), I empirically test if the industry homogeneity 
of auditees and their principal customers influence auditors’ efforts. The findings 
reveal that auditors are able to learn from understanding an entity if they are industry 
homogenous, which suggests that auditors are able to perform the risk assessment 
and related audit procedures more effectively and efficiently. In addition, the results 
from audit quality and financial reporting quality analyses show that the reduction in 




PART II SUPPLIER CHAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND COST BEHAVIOR 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
This chapter empirically examine if characteristics in terms of length (the layers 
of intermediaries in the supply chain) and width (the customer concentration) 
influence the extent of responsiveness in adjusting corporate capacity. Using a 
sample of non-financial U.S. firms between 1978 and 2012, I find that channel length 
is negatively associated with cost responsiveness. Owing to the bullwhip effect, firms 
with longer layers of intermediaries are more difficult to decompose the demand 
signal noises and digest the sales uncertainties, which deter firms from making 
responsive capacity adjustment. In addition, I find a negative association between 
channel width and cost responsiveness. Owing to the relationship specific investment, 
firms are reluctant to adjust the capacity responsively as they have an incentive to 




PART II SUPPLIER CHAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND COST BEHAVIOR 
1. Introduction  
Cost behavior is an important topic in accounting. There is a large body of 
research investigating the impacts of managerial decisions on cost behavior (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 2003; Banker et al., 2014b; Cannon, 2014; Chen et al,, 2012). 
Recent studies focus on the antecedents of the asymmetric response of capacity costs 
to activities changes, including government legislation (Banker et al., 2013), the 
demand uncertainty (Banker et al., 2014a), the incentive to beat earnings target 
(Kama and Weiss, 2013), and its consequences (Banker and Chen, 2006; Weiss, 
2010). Despite this, there are relatively few cross-sectional studies to examine how 
the capacity adjustment could be influenced by the interplay of managerial influences 
and supply chain variations.  
Capacity planning is a deliberate managerial decision. According to Banker et al. 
(2018), managers have to consider a combination of incentives and constraints when 
making capacity choices. While a body of literature empirically tests the factors 
hindering capacity adjustment, one important factor has been unexplored which is 
the Bullwhip effect. This refers to a phenomenon in which sales fluctuation amplifies 
when the demand signals move upstream along the supply chain channel. According 




order flows as forecast errors tend to be amplified and aggregated from a series of 
downstream orders. To check if upstream firms are more difficult to make capacity 
adjustment, I empirically test if there are differential impacts on SG&A elasticity.  
The purpose of this study is to examine why and how capacity adjustment be 
affected by firm-specific supply chain characteristics. According to Patatoukas 
(2012), researchers should “jointly examine the characteristics and dynamics of 
upstream and downstream”. This motivates me to test if the SG&A elasticity is 
influenced by the length and width of the supply chain channel. First, I examine how 
bullwhip effect hinders firms from making capacity planning. I conjecture that the 
longer the layers, the noisier the demand signals will be. The theory of the bullwhip 
effect leads me to predict that upstream firms are less cost responsive as they are 
eager to avoid resources adjustment costs arising from misguided capacity decision. 
Second, I examine if firms with concentrated customer base are associated with 
lower cost responsiveness. I have no ex-ante prediction as firms could accommodate 
the capacity quickly (slowly) if they have private information from customers (an 
incentive to recoup firm-specific investment). 
Using 30,778 firm-year observations from 1978-2012, the ordinary lease square 
(OLS) regression indicates that upstream firms are less responsive in adjusting its 




change in selling and administrative costs (SG&A); whereas for downstream firm 
(DLAYER =0), 1% change in sales results in it 0.682% change in SG&A. The lower 
SG&A elasticity suggests that upstream firms are more difficult to rely on noisy 
demand signals to make capacity choices. In addition, the cost stickiness analysis 
shows that the asymmetric cost responses are more salient for upstream firms. The 
difference in SG&A elasticity is 0.502% and 0.433% for firms with DLAYER =1 and 
DLAYER = 0 respectively, suggesting that upstream firms are more vulnerable to 
resource adjustment costs. 
Next, I perform cross-sectional analyses to provide further evidence to explain 
the mechanism of bullwhip effect by exploring the cross-sectional variations in 
macro-economic conditions, operating history, information spillover, confirming 
signals, industry competitiveness and strategic positioning on SG&A elasticity. The 
cross-sectional results reveal that the effect is stronger when firms are in good years, 
low competitive industries, with longer operating history, with confirming signals 
and with high profit margin.   
I also examine if firms with narrow base of customers exhibit differential 
SG&A elasticity. I have no ex-ante prediction as customer concentration could 
influence capacity decisions differently. On one hand, cost responsiveness could be 




customer firms. On the other hand, cost responsiveness could be lower if firms are 
reluctant to disinvest or curtail the scale of capacity of their relation-specific 
investment. The result shows SG&A elasticity decrease with customer concentration, 
which suggests the latter argument prevails. 
In robustness checks, I check if the results are robust to the alternative measure 
of layer and restricted sample. First, I develop an industry-level of layer variable 
(IND_LAYER), based on the annual input and output data provided by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. Second, I perform 
the main analyses on the manufacturing sub-samples. The results of the channel 
length and width analyses still hold.   
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it enriches 
the growing body of literature in cost adjustment (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003; Banker 
et al., 2014b; Cannon, 2014; Chen et al,, 2012). This is one of the first studies to link 
the cost accounting literature to the bullwhip literature. Despite the growing interests 
of bullwhip phenomenon, there are relatively few economic-based studies addressing 
its impacts on capacity decisions. Therefore, I respond to the call of Patatoukas (2012) 
to study the underlying causes and mechanisms of differential cost responses. These 
pieces of works should corroborate with anecdotal evidence (see Dooley et al., 2010) 




showing that the asymmetric cost behavior is more pronounced when firms have 
longer layers of intermediaries and narrower base of customers. The findings suggest 
that a low SG&A elasticity can be explained by firms’ incentives to get rid of 
misguided decisions. 
The rest of the essay is arranged as follow: Section 2 discusses the hypotheses 
development and literature review. Section 3 describes the research design and 






2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Cost behavior 
Costs could be broadly classified into fixed costs and variable costs (Horngren 
et al., 2012). The former increase proportionately with activity levels, and the latter 
remain constant when the changes in activity are within the relevant range. If a 
change in activity does not change the amount of costs proportionately nor remain 
the same, this is categorized as semi-variable cost. This conceptual definition helps 
us to analyze and predict how costs behave as a result of activity change. Despite this, 
this classification limits our understanding of the true relationship between activity 
and cost as the role of managerial influences is neglected in this literature. 
 The concept of deliberate managerial decision theory is later developed in the 
cost behavior literature (Anderson et al., 2003). This theory is complementary to 
traditional classification by suggesting the decision-making role of managers in cost 
management. Accordingly, managers will consider the size of resources adjustment 
costs when making capacity decision. The adjustment costs (e.g. severance payments, 
recruitment costs and retraining costs) are high when firms need to restore the 
capacity. Therefore, they are reluctant to scale down the capacity. Studies along this 
line find that asymmetric response of cost to sales increase as opposed to sales 




For brevity, a summary table of previous cost management research is prepared in 
table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE ONE HERE] 
 
2.2 Bullwhip effect 
According to Forrester (1958), bullwhip phenomenon refers to a situation in 
which amplified sales variations are exhibited by upper echelon of the supply chain. 
Such variation occurs when “orders to the supplier tend to have larger variance than 
sales to the buyer, and the distortion propagates upstream in an amplified form (Lee 
et al., 1997, p.546)”. Bray and Mendelson (2012) report that on average the standard 
deviation of upstream demand is greater than the downstream demand by $ 20 
million. Therefore, inbound orders from downstream members contain aggregated 
forecast errors, which are difficult to digest and decompose. 
To the producer end, bullwhip effects could lead to destructive operational 
consequences. First, demand signal noises could misguide upstream firms to expand 
its capacity. However, this may lead to wastage of resources as excessive capacity is 
built. Therefore, upstream firms have incentives to avoid sizable adjustment costs 
and are reluctant to adjust its capacity responsively. Second, upstream firms 




see through the true demand patterns.  
A line of studies empirically tests the existence of bullwhip phenomenon. 
Cachon et al. (2007) use industry-level measure to show that amplified sales 
variations exist in wholesaler firms. In a later study, Bray and Mendelson (2012) 
develop a firm-level measure to find that more than two-third of the sample firms 
experience amplified demand signals. In addition, Isaksson and Seifert (2016) use a 
sample of two-echelon supplier and customer firms and find that bullwhip 
phenomenon is prevalent across industries. Moreover, Zhao et al. (2018) find that the 
bullwhip effect becomes attenuated when the relationship between supplier and its 
customers is mature. 
[INSERT TABLE TWO HERE] 
 
To the producer end, firms could experience larger sales variances as its 
inbound order from downstream members contain aggregated forecast errors. The 
longer the length, the greater the demands signal noises will be, which could hinder 
firms from making capacity decision. Indeed, anecdotal evidence also suggests that 
upper echelons of the supply chain are slower in adjusting its capacity (Dooley et al., 
2010). This may suggest that firms with longer length of intermediaries have 




resources adjustment costs2. 
In conclusion, upstream firms are less responsive in capacity adjustment for two 
reasons. First, upstream firms are not able to see through the true demand pattern as 
the demand signals are noisy. Thus, they will hold up the capacity decision until they 
are able to digest the demand signals. Second, upstream firms have an economic 
incentive to keep away from resource adjustment costs. After curtailing the scale of 
operation, a turnaround situation (e.g. sales rebound) may requires firms to commit 
extra resources in scaling up the capacity. Therefore, firms are reluctant to adjust the 
capacity responsively to avoid costly mistakes. Therefore, cost responsiveness 
decrease with channel length. The aforementioned discussion suggests that as 





                                                     
2 According to Torres and Maltz (2010), the resource adjustment costs represents 15-25% of total 
costs  
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative association between channel length and cost 




2.3 Customer Concentration 
Another dimension of the supply chain is the channel width. This refers to the 
extent to which a firm’s revenue is concentrated to a narrow base of major customers. 
The width of supply chain could affect the cost adjustments in two different ways. 
On one hand, firms with high customer concentration could “foster information 
sharing along the supply chain and help supplier firms streamline production” 
(Patatoukas, 2012, p.364). Therefore, the strong economic ties could facilitate the 
flow of private information between supplier firms and their major customers. 
Accordingly, a high cost responsiveness is expected. 
 On the other hand, concentrated firms may hold up their capacity decisions for 
some strategic reasons. First, concentrated firms may have specific investments into 
their customers, which may discourage firms from curtailing the scale of operation or 
disinvesting from it. From the perspective of diversification, concentrated firms are 
associated with greater demand uncertainty as “they have relatively undiversified 
source of revenue, and their customer-specific investments prevent them from easily 
finding alternative sales” (Irvine et al., 2016, p.886). As a result, concentrated firm 
has to consider the best alternative use of its investment3. Second, the deployability 
                                                     
3 In making capacity decision, firms have to consider both exit cost and opportunity cost. Despite that 
the customer-specific investments are sunk costs, opportunities cost varies if the committed resources 
are redeployed outside the existing relationship. Therefore, the customer-specific investment is 




of customer-specific investment is generally low as it is hardly to be transferred to 
other customers. According to Raman and Shahrur (2008), a scale down of capacity 
could result in a realized loss. Based on the above reasons, concentrated firms should 
have an incentive to remain the committed resources. Therefore, a low cost 
responsiveness is expected. 
 In conclusion, the tensions between strong economic ties and relationship 
specific investment lead me to have no ex-ante predictions on the association 
between channel width and cost responsiveness. This hypothesis (H2) in null form is 
summarized as below:  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is no association between channel width and cost 




3. Research design and methodology 
3.1 Model specification  
Given that forecasted sales are not observable, the input and output relationship 
between activity and capacity spending could be depicted in the following model4:   
Model (1) captures the cost responsiveness by considering the mechanistic 
relationship between sales and selling and administrative spending.  
The model is further expanded by incorporating a battery of channel variables 
and control variables to address how the cost responsiveness is influenced by the 
supply chain variations. The expanded model is summarized as follow:  
The dependent variable of regression (2) is an output-based measure of capacity 
decision, which is measured by the logarithm transformation of change in selling and 
administrative costs (ΔSG&Ait). Its independent variable is an input-based measure 
of capacity choice, which is equal to the logarithm transformation of change in sales 
(ΔSALESit). 
                                                     
4 SG&A is commonly used as input measure while sales is considered as an output measure. In this 
study, I examine how SG&A elasticity is influenced by a set of supply chain variables and sales 
forecast. As sales forecast is ex-ante not observable, I follow Anderson et al. (2003) and include 
change in realized sales as a proxy of sales forecast.  
ΔSG&Aj,t = α0 + α1 ΔSALES*j,t + ε  - (1) 
ΔSG&A it = β0 + β1 ΔSALES it + β2 CHANNEL x ΔSALES it  





 The channel variable (CHANNELit) takes two different forms: channel length 
and channel width. The channel length measures the lengths of the layers involved in 
the supply chain channel. To construct this variable, I firstly identify the next 
immediate customers of firms’ major customer based on the gvkey indicators 
contained in the segment filing. Next, I continue the matching process until no more 
immediate customers could be identified. Finally, I select the longest layer as firms 
may be involved in several supply chain channels. Therefore, the continuous form of 
layer variables (CLAYER) represents the maximum layers among several channels 
within the same firm. For the ease of economic interpretation, I also translate 
CLAYER to a binary variable (DLAYER), which is equal to 1 if the number of layers 
is greater than its median, and 0 otherwise.  
 Another channel variable is the channel width, which measures the extent to 
which a firm’s revenue is derived from its principal customers. I follow previous 
research (e.g. Patatoukas, 2012; Irvine, et al., 2016) by generating a Herfindal index. 
To do this, I firstly compute the sales ratio by dividing the sales to each individual 
customer by total sales. Then, I sum the square root of sales ratios by firm to form 
the concentration ratio (CCG), which captures the degree of diversification and the 
relative importance of individual customers. If a firm is having a high CCG, this 




of economic interpretation, I also translate it into binary form (DCC), which is equal 
to 1 if CCG is larger than its median, and 0 otherwise. 
A set of control variables is incorporated in regression (1) to address the 
potential influence of corporate characteristics on the capacity decision (Chen et al., 
2012). Assets intensity (ASSET) is measured as the log transformation of total assets 
scaled by sales. Labor intensity (EMPLOYEE) is measured as the number of 
employees divided by sales. To control for the influence of other unobservable 
factors on SG&A elasticity, both stand-alone and interaction between controls and 
ΔSALES are included. In addition, industry fixed effects and Gross National Product 
(GROWTH) are also incorporated to control the potential influence of industry and 
time-variant macro-economic factors 5 . The definitions of key variables are 
summarized in Appendix A.  
 
[INSERT APPENDIX A HERE] 
 
 I predict that the coefficient ofΔSALES (β1) is positively associated with 
ΔSG&A as corporate spending on selling and administrative costs are mainly driven 
                                                     
5 The year fixed effect is excluded as “GROWTH” variable is included to capture the potential 
fluctuations in SG&A over time due to macro-economic conditional change. The inclusion of 
“GROWTH” variable will subsume the year fixed effect. In addition, the inclusion of firm fixed effect 





by its sales forecast. In addition, the first hypothesis (H1) leads me to predict that 
upstream firms are less responsive in adjusting their capacity as they are more 
difficult to digest the demand signal noises. Therefore, I predict that firms with more 
than one layer of intermediaries are less responsive (β1+ β2 < β1). However, I have 
no ex-ante prediction in the channel width analysis. 
 
3.2 Sample selection 
In the U.S., all listed firms are required to disclose the identities of its major 
customers and the sales amounts from each major customers (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, 1976)6. The major customer disclosure enables me to identify the 
linkage between firms and their downstream members (e.g. from next immediate 
level towards the end of the supply chain).  
The initial sample consists of all non-financial companies included in the 
COMPUSTAT Segment Filing during 1978-2012. First, I check the names of firms 
according to their similarities and sequences of letters as the disclosed names are 
expressed in abbreviations and not consistent across years. After matching, the initial 
sample consists of 49,685 supplier-year observations. Next, I follow previous studies 
                                                     
6 The disclosure requirement on major customers was initially set on 1976. It prescribed all listed 
companies in U.S. should disclose “the fact, the total amount of revenues from each such customer, 
and the identity of the segment or segments reporting the revenues’’ if revenues derived from a 





and delete observations in the financial industry (SIC: 6000 – 6799) and regulated 
industry (SIC: 4800 - 4999). I further exclude firms with omitted financial data. As a 
result, the final sample consists 30,778 firm-year observations. Table 3 tabulates the 
sample formation process. 
 





4. Empirical Results  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics on the untransformed and regression 
variables. For untransformed variables, sales (SALES) and selling and administrative 
costs (SG&A) have a mean of $959.52 (million) and $181.03 (million) respectively. 
For untransformed channel variable, the mean value of the layer variable (CLAYER) 
is 1.20 and its maximum value is 6.00. On average, our sample firms report a 
concentration ratio (CCG) of 0.11, which is compatible with Patatoukas (2012)’s 
finding. 
For regression variables, the change of sales (ΔSALES) and the change of 
selling administrative costs (ΔSG&A) are 0.11 and 0.12 respectively. On average, 
0.31 of our sample firms experiences a sales decrease (DECREASE) between 1978 to 
2012. For control variables, the mean value of the logarithm transformed asset 
turnover is -0.03 while the average value of Gross National Product (GNP) is 3.00%. 
In addition, our sample firms report an average of number of employees of 4.22 
(thousand).   
 





Table 5 presents the correlation matrix between our regression variables. 
Consistent with prior literature, ΔSALES is positively associated withΔSG&A , r = 
0.641, p = 0.000 and Decrease is negatively correlated withΔSG&A , r = -0.418, p = 
0.000. In addition, a low variance inflation factors indicates that multi-collinearity is 
not a significant concern in the study.  
 
















4.2  Channel length analysis 
The results for the channel length analysis are summarized in table 6. The 
estimations of regression (1) with continuous and binary layer variables are reported 
in column (1) and (2) respectively. The underlying assumption of hypothesis one is 
that upstream firms are more difficult to make production planning due to the 
demand signal noises. This is supported by a negative coefficient of CLAYER x 
ΔSALES (DLAYER x ΔSALES) with a value of -0.018 (t = -2.50) (-0.032 (t = -3.48)), 
which suggests that firms with longer channel length behave less responsively7. 
The primary interest of the study is to investigate if upstream firms exhibit 
differential cost responses to sales changes. A comparison table is inserted in table 6 
for the ease of interpreting its economic significance. For firms with less than 1.60 
layers (DLAYER = 0) (firms with more than 1.60 layers (DLAYER = 1)), 1% change 
in sales would lead to 0.682% (0.650%) change of selling and administrative costs 
(SG&A). The results suggest that SG&A elasticity decrease with channel length. 
Therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported. 
[INSERT TABLE SIX HERE] 
 
                                                     
7 In an untabulated test, regression (1) is performed with (a) sales increasing and decreasing samples 
and (b) CCG and DCC variables to control the potential influence of channel width. The results are 




4.3  Channel width analysis 
Hypothesis 2 is tested by re-running model (1) with the continuous form and 
binary form of customer concentration variables8. The results of channel width 
analysis are reported in table 7. In column (1), CCG x ΔSALES is significantly 
negative with a value of -0.277 (t = -14.74) whereas the coefficient of DCC x 
ΔSALES is -0.065 (t = -8.68).  
For brevity, a comparison table is included in table 7. For firms with customer 
concentration ratio lower than 0.11 (DCC = 0), 1% change in sales leads to 0.711% 
change in SG&A. However, when DCC moves from 0 to 1, 1% in sales change leads 
to 0.646% change in SG&A. The results suggest that the firms with concentrated 
customers are less responsive in adjusting its capacity as they have a stake in the 
relation specific investment. Therefore, the incentive to recoup their investment 
represents a hindrance to capacity planning. 
 




                                                     
8 In an untabulated test, channel width analysis is performed with sales increasing and decreasing 




4.4  Cost stickiness analysis 
 Next, I examine if asymmetric cost response are influenced by variations in 
supply chain characteristics. Regression (1) is expanded as follow:   
All the variables in regression (2) are the same as the baseline model except 
DECREASE and its interaction terms. I follow Banker and Anderson (2002) by 
incorporating a binary variable of sales decrease (DECREASE), which is equal to 1 if 
sales decrease in year t and 0 otherwise, to test its asymmetric cost responses. In 
addition, DECREASE is interacted with ΔSALES and other regression variables.  
For channel length analysis, the results of estimations on regression (2) are 
reported in table 8. First, I find that firms with DLAYER = 1 exhibit lower SG&A 
elasticity in both sales increase (0.025%) and sales decrease periods (0.094%). 
Second, I find that the asymmetric cost responses are more pronounced for upstream 
firms (DLAYER = 1), in which the difference in SG&A elasticity is 0.502% change. 
The results are consistent with previous research (e.g. Anderson et al., 2003) in 
which SG&A cost behaves asymmetrically. Therefore, firms with longer layers are 
even more cautious in curtailing its capacity. 
ΔSG&A it =   β0+ β1 ΔSALES it + β2 DECREASE x ΔSALES it  
+ β3 CHANNEL x ΔSALES it  
+ β4 CHANNEL x DECREASE x ΔSALES it 
+ β5 CHANNEL x DECREASE + β6 CHANNEL it  





 [INSERT TABLE EIGHT HERE] 
 
For channel width analysis, the estimations on regression (2) are reported in 
table 9. I find that both concentrated firms (DCC=1) and non-concentrated firms 
(DCC=0) behave asymmetrically, in which the difference in cost response is 0.429% 
and 0.472% respectively. This is consistent with prior literature in which 
sales-decreasing firms are reluctant to scale down its capacity to avoid the resources 
adjustment costs.  
 
[INSERT TABLE NINE HERE] 
 
4.5 Cross-sectional tests 
To provide further evidence on the boundary condition which influences cost 
response behavior and illuminate the mechanism of bullwhip effect, I explore the 
cross-sectional variations in macro-economic conditions, operating history, 
information spillover, confirming signals, industry competitiveness and strategic 






4.5.1. Macro-economic conditions: Good years versus Bad years 
 According to Dooley et al. (2010), firms in upper echelon of the supply chain 
(e.g. wholesaler) behave less responsively in recession times. To test if the bullwhip 
effect on capacity adjustment is more pronounced in bad years, I run model (1) and 
(2) on two sub-samples: good year and bad year samples (1987, 1998, 2007, 2008 
and 2009)9. 
 The results on regression (1) run on sub-samples are reported in table 10. As 
reported in panel A, I find that firms with DLAYER=1 behave less responsively in 
good years (but not for bad years), in which 0.035% change in SG&A per 1 % 
change in sales. In addition, the variable of interest (DLAYER x ΔSALES) does not 
differ (chi-square = 0.28).  
 Results on cost stickiness tests are reported in Panel B of Table 10. I continue to 
find that firm with DLAYER=1 behaves less responsively in good years. In addition, I 
find that the asymmetric cost behavior are more pronounced in good years, in which 
firms with DLAYER=1 (DLAYER=0) experience 0.588% (0.524%) difference in 
SG&A elasticity. Despite this, DLAYER x DECREASE x ΔSALES does not differ 
(chi-square = 0.09). Overall, the results show that the influence of bullwhip effect on 
SG&A elasticity is more salient in good years.  
                                                     
9 I also follow Loh and Stulz (2018) and bisect the samples according to the recession time defined by 




[INSERT TABLE TEN HERE] 
 
 Next, the channel width analysis is performed on the same bisected samples. 
The results in Panel A of Table 11 show that concentrated firms (DCC=1) behaves 
less responsively in both good (0.057%) and bad years (0.119%). The variable of 
interest (DCC x ΔSALES) differ across good years and bad years (chi-square = 3.47). 
In Panel B, I continue to find the asymmetric costs responses exist in good years only. 
In good years, firms with DCC=1 and DCC=0 experience 0.526% and 0.565% 
difference in SG&A respectively. The variable of interest (DCC x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES) does not differ across sub-sample (chi-square = 0.27).  
 











4.5.2 Operating history: Young firms versus Mature firms 
To check if young firms are more reluctant to curtail its scale of operation 
during initial years of operation, I re-run model (1) and (2) on sub-samples bisected 
by the median age of firms. The results are reported in Table 12. In Panel A, it reports 
that the influence of bullwhip effect on SG&A elasticity is more pronounced for 
mature firms in which the cost response difference is 0.071%. In addition, DLAYER x 
ΔSALES differ between young firms and mature firms (chi-square = 2.98). When the 
attention is switched to its impact on asymmetric cost behavior, I find in Panel B that 
asymmetric cost responses exist in both samples with DLAYER x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES, which do not differ across samples (chi-square = 0.08). 
Next, I perform the channel width analysis on both young and mature firm 
sub-samples. The results are reported in Table 13. In Panel A, it is reported the 
concentrated firms (DCC=1) in both young and mature samples have significantly 
lower cost responses, 0.075% and 0.055% respectively. The variable of interest 
(DCC x DECREASE) does not differ (chi-square = 0.61). In Panel B, it is found that 
asymmetric cost responses are exhibited in both sub-samples across firms, with DCC 
x DECREASE x ΔSALES , which do not differ significantly (chi-square = 0.84). 





4.5.3 Information spillover: Common auditors versus Non-common auditors 
According to Cai et al. (2016), auditors shared by business entities serve as 
information intermediaries which can facilitate knowledge transfer between firms. To 
examine if the bullwhip effect on SG&A elasticity is different for firms shared the 
auditors with the channel members, I run model (1) and (2) on the sub-samples 
bisected by a binary variable (COMMON), which is equal to 1 if a firm shares the 
auditor with at least one of its major customers or other downstream firms and 0 
otherwise.  
The results of channel length analysis are reported in Panel A of table 14 reveal 
that bullwhip effect on SG&A cost elasticity exist in both sub-sample. The 
interaction term (DLAYER x ΔSALES) does not differ across sub-samples (chi-square 
= 2.47). When I turn the attentions to the cost stickiness analysis reported in Panel B, 
I find that the asymmetric cost response is more pronounced in the common auditors 
sub-sample in which firms with DLAYER = 1 (DLAYER = 0) exhibits 0.677% 
(0.673%) SG&A cost difference. DLAYER x DECREASE x ΔSALES do not differ 
across firms (chi-square = 0.17). 






4.5.4 Signal noises: Confirming signals versus No confirming signals 
 To address the potential effect between firms with confirming signals and 
non-confirming signals, I performed the cross-sectional analysis on sub-sample 
bisected by the binary variable (CONFIRMING SIGNAL). To construct this variable, 
I firstly devise an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if both the firms and the 
major customers experience sales increase or sales decrease simultaneously. Second, 
the indicator variable is converted to weighted variable by dividing it by the total 
number of the major customers. Third, the weighted variables are then summed for 
each firm. CONFIRMING SIGNAL is equal to 1 if the weighted sum is greater than 
its median and 0 otherwise.   
 The results reported in Panel A of Table 15 show that the bullwhip effect on 
SG&A cost elasticity is more pronounced for firms with CONFIRMING SIGNAL= 1. 
Within confirming signals sub-sample, firms with DLAYER = 1 (DLAYER = 0) 
experience 0.677% (0.726%). DLAYER x ΔSALES do not differ (chi-square = 1.07). 
In addition, the cost stickiness analyses reported in Panel B show that differential 
cost response exists across firms in both samples. The interaction terms (DLAYER x 
DECREASE x ΔSALES) do not differently (chi-square = 1.13).  





4.5.5 Industry competitiveness: High competition versus Low competition 
 To explore the variations of the results across firms’ industries competitiveness, 
I run model (1) and (2) on sub-samples bisected by a binary variable (HIGH 
COMPETITION). To do this, I firstly construct the market share by dividing sales 
over industry sales. Next, I sum up the squared market share to get the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. HIGH COMPETITION is equal to 1 if the index is 
lower than its median and 0 otherwise.  
 The results reported in Panel A of Table 16 show that the bullwhip effect on 
SG&A cost are more evident in the high competition sub-sample, in which the 
difference in cost responses is 0.044%. In addition, in Panel B, I find that asymmetric 
cost responses exist across firms. DLAYER x ΔSALES and DLAYER x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES in model (1) and (2) do not differ significantly (chi-square = 0.36 and 0.09 
respectively). Overall, I find some evidence to show that firms in high competition 
groups are more vulnerable to the bullwhip effect (e.g. avoid building excessive 
capacity). 
 






4.5.6 Strategic positioning: High margin versus Low margin 
 To examine the variations across strategic positioning, the cross-sectional 
analyses are performed on sub-samples divided by a binary variable (HIGH 
MARGIN), which is equal to 1 if a firm’s profit margin is higher than the industry 
average of the profit margin and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in table 17.  
In Panel A, the channel length analysis reveals that the influence of bullwhip effect 
on SG&A cost is more salient in the high profit margin group, in which the 
difference in cost is 0.057% per 1 % change in sales. The interaction term of interest  
(DLAYER x ΔSALES) do not differ (chi-square = 1.66). In Panel B, I find that the 
asymmetric response exists across firms with DLAYER x DECREASE x ΔSALES, 
which differs across sub-samples (chi-square = 3.40).  
 





4.6 Robustness checks 
4.6.1 Alternative layer measure 
There are some limitations of using firm-specific layer variables. First, the layer 
variable is not constructed based on the whole population10. Second, the full layer of 
intermediaries may not be idenified due to the absence of data. Third, firms can 
choose to conceal the identity of their principal customers through confidential 
treatment (Ellis et al., 2012).  
As a robustness check, I develop an alternative layer varibale based on the 
annual industry data despite that it may not capture the variations within an industry. 
To do this, I firstly extract the annual input-and-output data and IO industry code 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the matirx, for each IO industry (seller), 
the output sold to each end-use IO industry (customer) are summarized. Then, this 
inter-industry linkage enables me to search the next level of industry until IO 
industry code were duplicately found in the supply chain, Next, I search the longest 
layers of intermediaries for a particular firm. As a result, the absolute amonunt of the 
layers involved represents the alternative measure of layer (IND_LAYER). The 
economic data covers a period starting from 1997 to 2012. 
                                                     




The results of channel length analysis and cost stickiness analysis using 
alternative industry layer measure are summarized in table 18. In Panel A, firms with 
(IND_LAYER = 1) exhibit lower cost response by 0.014% change in SG&A per 1% 
change in sales. In Panel B, differential cost responses are found in sales increasing 
period only.  
[INSERT TABLE EIGHTEEN HERE] 
 
4.6.2 Manufacturing firms versus Non-manufacturing firms 
 Next, I follow prior research by restricting my sample to manufacturing firms 
due to its distinctive channel characteristics (e.g. Anderson et al, 2003). The results 
reported in Table 19 are qualitatively the same with my previous findings. In Panel A, 
1% change in sales lead to 0.651% (0.616%) change in SG&A costs for firms with 
DLAYER = 1 (firms with DLAYER = 0). Results on cost stickienss analyses are 
reported in Panel B. It is reported that asymetric cost responses exists across firms in 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing samples.  
 





Next, the channel width analysis is performed on the restricted sample. In Panel 
A of Table 20, manufacturing firms with DCC = 1 continue to behave less 
responsively, in which 1% change in sales lead to 0.614% change in SG&A cost. 
When I switch to the cost stickiness analysis, I continue to find the asymmetric cost 
responses exist in both sub-sample.  
 
[INSERT TABLE TWENTY HERE] 
 
 Overall, the results are robust to using the alternative measure of industry layer 






 In this essay, I find that channel length is negatively associated with cost 
responsiveness, which is consistent with my conjecture that the longer the length, the 
greater the demand signals noises, which deter firms from making capacity 
adjustment. In addition, I also find that a negative association between channel width 
and cost responsiveness, which is consistent with the notion that the greater the 
concentration ratio, the greater relationship specific investment. Linked together, the 
results suggest that capacity adjustment is a complex deliberate decision in which a 
combination of non-activity factor have to be considered.  
This study is one of the first study to test the destructive consequences of the 
bullwhip phenomenon on capacity planning empirically. The economic-based 
evidence provides new insights to practitioners in understanding the effect of channel 
characteristics on SG&A elasticity. Before closing, several caveats are summarized. 
First, the data source limits the generalizability of the findings. In this study, only 
one-fourth of U.S. listed firms are included as the COMPUSTAT Segment Filing 
excludes firms with no major customers disclosure. Second, it is not practical to 
identify the complete supply chain linkage as non-major customers are excluded in 





Prior Empirical Research on cost behaviors 
Author Publication Sample Objective of Study Major Results 
Empirical Study 
Anderson et 





7,629 U.S. firms  
(1979-1998) 
Examine whether there are 
asymmetric cost response between 
sales-increasing and sales-decreasing 
firms relationship  
 
 
They find that there is asymmetric cost response between 
sales-increasing and sales-decreasing firms. On average, 1% increase 
(decrease) in sales lead to 0.55% increase (0.35 decrease) in selling 
and administrative costs.  





128,333 firms in 19 
OECD countries 
(1990-2008) 
Examine whether strict employment 
protection legislation leads to strong 
cost stickiness behavior 
 
 
They find that cost stickiness phenomenon is more profound in 
countries with stricter employee protection, confirming that managers 
consider adjustment cost when making capacity decisions.  
   







U.S. firms  
(1979-2009) 
Examine if cost stickiness behavior 




    
They confirm that managerial decision on capacity adjustment is 
influenced by previous sales performance. The findings indicate that 







504 firms in U.S. 
airline industry  
(1992-2007) 
Examine the determinants of cost 
stickiness behavior exhibited by U.S. 
airline companies  
He finds that sticky cost is incurred because airline industry retains 











Table 1 (Cont.) 
Prior Empirical Research on cost behaviors 
Author Publication Sample Objective of Study Major Results 
Empirical Study 





51,314 firms in the 




Examine if asymmetric cost response 
is associated with agency problems 
 
They report that asymmetric cost response is positively associated 
with agency incentives, including CEO tenures, and CEO 













Examine whether the incentive to 
meet or beat earning target lead to 
cost stickiness behavior  
They show that cost stickiness phenomenon is negatively associated 
with earnings incentives, suggesting that loss avoidance firms will 




















Prior Empirical Research on bullwhip effect  
Author Publication Sample Objective of Study Major Results 
Empirical Study 









(1992 – 2005) 
Examine if there are different 
demand variations among retail, 
wholesale and manufcuting firms 
 
 
They use industry –level data and find that bullwhip effect exists 








4,689 firms in U.S.  
(1974-2008)  
 
Empirically investigate if there are 
bullwhip effect  
  
   
They develop a firm-level measure of bullwhip effect and find 
that more than two third of the sample firms experience 












firms in U.S.  
(1976-2009) 
Examine if the bullwhip effect 
exist in two-echelon supply chain  
 
They report that the bullwhip effect is prevalent across 
industries. They also document that “the average amplification of 
demand variability between echelons is 90%”.   
Zhao et al. 
(2018) 
International Journal 





pairs in U.S.  
(1977-2013) 
 
Examine if the relationship 
between supplier and customer 
weaken the bullwhip phenomenon  
 
 
They find that the length of relationship reduce the bullwhip 










Table 2b  
Prior Empirical Research on customer concentration 








firms in U.S.  
(1977-2006) 
 
Examine if customer concentration is 
associated with accounting rate of 
return 
 
They find that suppliers with concentrated customer base are 
associated with higher returns. The findings suggest that the driver of 
profitability lies on the efficiency in managing its inventory, 
receivables and other assets. 




35,012 firms in 
U.S.  
(2002-2010) 
Examine if Big N auditors have a 
greater tendency to issue going 
concern opinions to distressed 
concentrated firms  
They report that low-quality Big N auditors have a higher probability 
of issuing inappropriate going concern opinions to clients who have 
higher customer concentration ratio. 






firms in U.S.  
(1977-2007)  
 
Examine if stage of life cycle 
influence the association between 
customer concentration and 
profitability 
  
They report that customer concentration is negatively associated with 
profitability during the early stages of life cycle. However, a positive 
association is observed when the relationship with their major 
customers becomes mature.  
Krishnan 
(2016) 
Working paper  
 
7,151 firms in U.S.  
(2000-2006) 
Examine if auditors exert fewer 
efforts on engagement for which 
clients who have high customer 
concentration 
They find that audit fee discounts are allowed to firms having high 
customer concentration, suggesting that audit firms pass the savings 





Appendix A  
Variable definitions 
Main Variables:  
ΔSG&A Logarithmic transformation of selling and administrative expenses divided by 
sales 
 
ΔSALES Logarithmic transformation of change in sales from year t-1 to year t 
 
Channel Variables (CHANNEL): 
CLAYER Logarithmic transformation of the absolute number of layers of major 
intermediaries  
 
DLAYER Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if CLAYER is greater than its median, and 0 
otherwise 
 
CCG Level of customer-base concentration 
 
DCC Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if CCG is greater than its median, and 0 
otherwise  
Other Variables: 
GROWTH Percentage changes in Gross National Product (GNP) 
 
ASSET Logarithmic transformation of total assets divided by sales 
 
EMPLOYEE Logarithmic transformation of total number of employees divided by sales 
DECREASE Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if sales in year t is lower than sales in year 
t-1 and 0 otherwise 
 
SUCCESS Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if sales in year t-1 is lower than sales in 







































Table 3  
Sample Selection 
This table presents the sample selection procedures for the baseline model and the model of 
asymmetric response.   
 
Procedures 
 Number of 
Observations 
Supplier-customers-year observations in the Compustat Segment 





Restrict our sample to supplier-year observations  
  
49,658 
Less:    
    Observations with missing value of customer sales  5,889 
    Observation in financial industry and regulated industry    855 
    Observations with missing financial variables   12,163 








































Descriptive Statistics (N =30,778) 
This table summarizes the descriptive statistics for the untransformed and regression (from 1976 to 
2012). All variables are winsorized at their 1% and 99% values.  






Sales (millions) $959.52 $4471.26 $95.13 $24.69 $401.57 
SG&A (millions) $181.03 $994.62 $19.81 $5.84 $68.24 
ASSET -0.03 0.68 -0.13 -0.48 0.35 
GNP Growth 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 
No. of Employees (thousands) 4.22 14.97 0.54 0.15 2.34 
ΔSG&A 0.11 0.29 0.09 -0.03 0.23 
ΔSALES 0.12 0.34 0.09 -0.04 0.25 
DECREASE 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CCG  0.11 0.16 0.04 0.02 0.12 







Correlation Matrix  
This table summarize the Pearson correlation matrix (N =30,778) 
 
Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)  (9) 
(1)ΔSG&A - 
 
        
(2)ΔSALES 0.641 
(0.000) 
        




       






      










    










    




















































Table 6  
Estimate for Channel length analysis  
This table reports the results from tests of the impact of bullwhip effect on cost responsiveness. The 
dependent variable is a change variable in selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) reports the results when layer is measured 
by raw (CLAYER) and binary (DLAYER) respectively. The t-value reported in the parentheses is 
calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER 
    
ΔSALES 0.699*** a 0.682*** 
 (31.327)  (33.017) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.018** b -0.032*** 
 (-2.500)  (-3.476) 
CHANNEL -0.001  0.001 
 (-0.212)  (0.384) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.356***  1.362*** 
 (7.105)  (7.138) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.074***  -0.073*** 
 (-16.887)  (-16.862) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.030***  0.029*** 
 (8.209)  (8.131) 
GROWTH 0.246***  0.248*** 
 (3.623)  (3.658) 
ASSET 0.036***  0.036*** 
 (16.069)  (16.017) 
EMPLOYEE 0.004**  0.004** 
 (2.512)  (2.522) 
Constant 0.023  0.022 
 (1.373)  (1.341) 
    
Observations 30,778  30,778 
R-squared 0.426  0.426 
Industry FE YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
DLAYER = 0    a  0.682 
DLAYER = 1   a + b  ___0.650___ 
Difference b      0.032 ††† 




Table 7  
Estimate for Channel width analysis  
This table reports the results from tests of the impact of customer concentration on cost 
responsiveness. The dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs (Δ
SG&A). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) reports the results when 
concentration ratio is measured by raw (CCG) and binary (DCC) respectively. The t-value reported 
in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 CCG  DCC 
    
ΔSALES 0.712*** a 0.711*** 
 (34.485)  (33.946) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.277*** b -0.065*** 
 (-14.742)  (-8.679) 
CHANNEL -0.018**  0.001 
 (-2.066)  (0.192) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.429***  1.401*** 
 (7.526)  (7.354) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.074***  -0.075*** 
 (-17.183)  (-17.320) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.029***  0.029*** 
 (8.119)  (8.138) 
GROWTH 0.221***  0.233*** 
 (3.274)  (3.435) 
ASSET 0.035***  0.036*** 
 (15.969)  (16.112) 
EMPLOYEE 0.004***  0.004** 
 (2.751)  (2.550) 
Constant 0.026  0.021 
 (1.561)  (1.264) 
    
Observations 30,778  30,778 
R-squared 0.431  0.427 
Industry FE YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
DCC = 0    a  0.711 
DCC = 1   a + b  ___0.646___ 
Difference 
 















Table 8  
Estimate for Cost stickiness analysis – Channel length 
This table reports the results from tests of the impact of bullwhip effect on cost stickiness. The 
dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) reports the results when layer is measured 
by raw (CLAYER) and binary (DLAYER) respectively. The t-value reported in the parentheses is 
calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  
Panel A: Full Sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER 
ΔSALES 0.886*** a 0.878*** 
 (34.729)  (38.115) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.398*** b -0.433*** 
 (-6.678)  (-8.255) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.012 c -0.025* 
 (-1.231)  (-1.938) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.043* d -0.069** 
 (-1.845)  (-2.220) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.005*  -0.013 
 (-1.682)  (-1.413) 
CHANNEL -0.001  0.002 
 (-0.268)  (0.331) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.685***  1.682*** 
 (7.348)  (7.348) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.021***  -0.021*** 
 (-4.139)  (-4.227) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.048***  0.047*** 
 (12.793)  (12.735) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.206***  -0.206*** 
 (-26.098)  (-26.261) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -1.335***  -1.335*** 
 (-3.215)  (-3.220) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.096***  -0.096*** 
 (-9.058)  (-9.101) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.036***  -0.036*** 
 (-4.041)  (-4.017) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.504***  0.503*** 
 (28.427)  (28.428) 
Constant 0.015  0.013 
 (1.034)  (0.892) 
Observations 30,778  30,778 
R-squared 0.442  0.442 
Industry FE YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Sales Increase Sales Decrease Difference 
DLAYER = 0  a a + b b 
 0.878 0.445  0.433 ††† 
DLAYER = 1  a + c  a + b + c + d   b + d 
____________ ____0.853___ ___0.351___    0.502 ††† 
 
Difference 
c     
0.025 † 
c + d     
0.094 ††† 






Estimate for Cost stickiness analysis – Channel width 
This table reports the results from tests of the impact of customer concentration on cost stickiness. 
The dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) reports the results when concentration ratio 
is measured by raw (CCG) and binary (DCC) respectively. The t-value reported in the parentheses is 
calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 CCG  DCC 
ΔSALES 0.914*** a 0.911*** 
 (39.625)  (38.814) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.488*** b -0.472*** 
 (-9.307)  (-8.845) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.325*** c -0.073*** 
 (-12.720)  (-7.093) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x ΔSALES 0.284*** d 0.043* 
 (4.280)  (1.818) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.012  -0.004 
 (-0.600)  (-0.766) 
CHANNEL 0.017  0.006 
 (1.342)  (1.536) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.662***  1.678*** 
 (7.284)  (7.332) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.023***  -0.022*** 
 (-4.686)  (-4.561) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.047***  0.047*** 
 (12.591)  (12.640) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.195***  -0.203*** 
 (-24.715)  (-25.768) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -1.233***  -1.226*** 
 (-2.989)  (-2.960) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.095***  -0.097*** 
 (-9.037)  (-9.178) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.036***  -0.036*** 
 (-4.015)  (-4.034) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.493***  0.501*** 
 (27.911)  (28.314) 
Constant 0.011  0.008 
 (0.751)  (0.562) 
Observations 30,778  30,778 
R-squared 0.446  0.443 
Industry FE YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Sales Increase Sales Decrease Difference 
DCC = 0  a a + b b 
 0.911 0.439  0.472 ††† 
DCC = 1  a + c  a + b + c + d   b + d 
____________ ____0.838___ ___0.409___    0.429 ††† 
 
Difference 
c     
0.073 ††† 
c + d     
0.030 







Cross-sectional tests: Good year versus Bad year – Channel length 
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: Good year versus Bad year. Panel A 
(Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost stickiness). The dependent variable is a 
change variable of selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) report the results for good years (bad years). 
The t-value reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors. 
Panel A: Channel length analysis 
  Good Year Bad Year 
10a (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.697*** a 0.679*** 0.703*** a 0.693*** 
 (28.485)  (29.931) (12.280)  (13.112) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.019** b -0.035*** -0.011 b -0.015 
 (-2.452)  (-3.514) (-0.551)  (-0.663) 
CHANNEL -0.001  0.001 0.001  0.005 
 (-0.302)  (0.197) (0.085)  (0.588) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.467***  1.477*** 0.740  0.734 
 (7.062)  (7.121) (1.190)  (1.180) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.079***  -0.079*** -0.042***  -0.041*** 
 (-16.767)  (-16.722) (-3.498)  (-3.495) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.029***  0.029*** 0.030***  0.030*** 
 (7.512)  (7.430) (3.214)  (3.197) 
GROWTH 0.263***  0.265*** 0.041  0.044 
 (3.524)  (3.559) (0.194)  (0.206) 
ASSET 0.037***  0.037*** 0.029***  0.029*** 
 (15.147)  (15.110) (5.542)  (5.488) 
EMPLOYEE 0.006***  0.006*** -0.007*  -0.007* 
 (3.794)  (3.798) (-1.763)  (-1.740) 
Constant 0.054***  0.052*** -0.114***  -0.113*** 
 (2.923)  (2.905) (-2.858)  (-2.881) 
       
Observations 25,412  25,412 5,366  5,366 
R-squared 0.433  0.433 0.396  0.396 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Good Year Bad Year  





DLAYER= 1 a + b 
0.644 

















†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Good Year Bad Year 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DLAYER = 0 a 
0.913 














b + d 
0.588††† 



















Table 10 (Cont.)   
Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
 Good Year    Bad Year 
10b (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.922*** a 0.913*** 0.750*** a 0.751*** 
 (32.997)  (36.038) (11.237)  (12.683) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.492*** b -0.524*** -0.166 b -0.212 
 (-7.563)  (-9.174) (-1.036)  (-1.478) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.012 c -0.024* -0.004 c -0.019 
 (-1.187)  (-1.675) (-0.161)  (-0.585) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
-0.042* d -0.064* -0.049 d -0.098 
 (-1.669)  (-1.850) (-0.750)  (-1.283) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.005  -0.006 -0.007  -0.033* 
 (-1.376)  (-0.631) (-0.984)  (-1.665) 
CHANNEL -0.002  -0.002 0.002  0.013 
 (-0.475)  (-0.267) (0.199)  (1.081) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.687***  1.687*** 0.823  0.812 
 (6.525)  (6.539) (1.217)  (1.202) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.027***  -0.028*** 0.012  0.011 
 (-5.093)  (-5.180) (0.814)  (0.783) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.052***  0.052*** 0.030***  0.030*** 
 (12.837)  (12.768) (3.118)  (3.133) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.214***  -0.214*** -0.164***  -0.164*** 
 (-25.000)  (-25.157) (-8.002)  (-8.053) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -1.382***  -1.379*** 2.502*  2.459* 
 (-3.098)  (-3.096) (1.716)  (1.687) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.089***  -0.089*** -0.130***  -0.130*** 
 (-7.714)  (-7.757) (-4.709)  (-4.681) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.050***  -0.050*** 0.002  -0.000 
 (-5.178)  (-5.134) (0.068)  (-0.009) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.507***  0.507*** 0.494***  0.492*** 
 (26.269)  (26.275) (10.861)  (10.831) 
Constant 0.037**  0.033** -0.081**  -0.080** 
 (2.228)  (2.108) (-2.257)  (-2.364) 
       
Observations 25,412  25,412 5,366  5,366 
R-squared 0.450  0.450 0.410  0.410 






Cross-sectional tests: Good year versus Bad year – Channel width 
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: Good year versus Bad year. Panel A 
(Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost stickiness). The dependent variable is a 
change variable of selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) report the results for good years (bad years). 
The t-value reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors. 
Panel A: Channel width analysis 
 Good Year  Bad Year  
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CCG  DCC CCG    DCC 
       
ΔSALES 0.708*** a 0.704*** 0.734*** a 0.760*** 
 (31.211)  (30.593) (13.923)  (14.136) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.269*** b -0.057*** -0.348*** b -0.119*** 
 (-13.088)  (-7.019) (-7.473)  (-6.197) 
CHANNEL -0.009  0.000 -0.055***  0.002 
 (-0.880)  (0.093) (-2.753)  (0.358) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.561***  1.514*** 0.626  0.648 
 (7.551)  (7.304) (1.016)  (1.047) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.080***  -0.081*** -0.037***  -0.037*** 
 (-17.179)  (-17.279) (-3.112)  (-3.103) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.029***  0.029*** 0.028***  0.030*** 
 (7.482)  (7.449) (3.054)  (3.275) 
GROWTH 0.237***  0.250*** 0.046  0.032 
 (3.188)  (3.354) (0.218)  (0.152) 
ASSET 0.037***  0.037*** 0.028***  0.029*** 
 (15.088)  (15.166) (5.392)  (5.607) 
EMPLOYEE 0.007***  0.006*** -0.006*  -0.007* 
 (4.024)  (3.854) (-1.687)  (-1.809) 
Constant 0.055***  0.051*** -0.107***  -0.115*** 
 (3.026)  (2.845) (-2.738)  (-2.950) 
       
Observations 25,412  25,412 5,366  5,366 
R-squared 0.437  0.434 0.406  0.401 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Good Year Bad Year  





DCC = 1 a + b 
0.647 


















Table 11 (Cont.)        
Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
  Good Year  Bad Year  
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CCG  DCC CCG  DCC 
       
ΔSALES 0.946*** a 0.941*** 0.813*** a 0.832*** 
 (37.280)  (36.444) (13.764)  (13.797) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.584*** b -0.565*** -0.262* b -0.263* 
 (-10.209)  (-9.718) (-1.833)  (-1.803) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.317*** c -0.063*** -0.403*** c -0.146*** 
 (-11.391)  (-5.595) (-6.230)  (-5.552) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
0.304*** d 0.039 0.275* d 0.089 
 (4.161)  (1.511) (1.692)  (1.473) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.015  -0.004 0.005  -0.007 
 (-0.642)  (-0.630) (0.107)  (-0.543) 
CHANNEL 0.029**  0.005 -0.027  0.014 
 (2.065)  (1.127) (-0.895)  (1.512) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.702***  1.689*** 0.560  0.638 
 (6.617)  (6.547) (0.836)  (0.947) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.030***  -0.030*** 0.016  0.019 
 (-5.744)  (-5.614) (1.135)  (1.326) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.052***  0.052*** 0.029***  0.030*** 
 (12.694)  (12.735) (3.057)  (3.169) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.202***  -0.211*** -0.159***  -0.160*** 
 (-23.588)  (-24.712) (-7.862)  (-7.852) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -1.317***  -1.288*** 2.762*  2.740* 
 (-2.970)  (-2.893) (1.911)  (1.889) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.087***  -0.089*** -0.136***  -0.140*** 
 (-7.617)  (-7.744) (-4.945)  (-5.098) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.050***  -0.050*** 0.004  0.003 
 (-5.223)  (-5.234) (0.160)  (0.130) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.496***  0.505*** 0.489***  0.488*** 
 (25.735)  (26.169) (10.847)  (10.785) 
Constant 0.031*  0.029* -0.084**  -0.090*** 
 (1.944)  (1.832) (-2.486)  (-2.629) 
       
Observations 25,412  25,412 5,366  5,366 
R-squared 0.453  0.450 0.419  0.414 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Good Year Bad Year 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DCC = 0 a 
0.941 














b + d 
0.526††† 























Table 12  
Cross-sectional tests: Young firms versus Mature firms – Channel length 
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: Young firms versus Mature firms. 
Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost stickiness). The dependent 
variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). All other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) report the results for young firms 
(mature firms). The t-value reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors.  
Panel A: Channel length analysis   
 Young Firms Mature Firms 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.658*** a 0.653*** 0.807*** a 0.744*** 
 (23.804)  (25.484) (19.572)  (19.711) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.006 b -0.018 -0.060*** b -0.071*** 
 (-0.613)  (-1.486) (-5.010)  (-4.841) 
CHANNEL 0.000  0.002 0.002  0.005 
 (0.010)  (0.352) (0.542)  (1.096) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.439***  1.444*** 0.672*  0.732** 
 (6.051)  (6.072) (1.904)  (2.079) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.076***  -0.075*** -0.064***  -0.064*** 
 (-13.957)  (-13.910) (-7.966)  (-7.965) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.025***  0.025*** 0.042***  0.042*** 
 (5.498)  (5.445) (6.623)  (6.566) 
GROWTH 0.133  0.133 0.360***  0.365*** 
 (1.430)  (1.426) (3.759)  (3.805) 
ASSET 0.036***  0.036*** 0.031***  0.031*** 
 (11.941)  (11.924) (9.969)  (9.886) 
EMPLOYEE 0.003  0.003 -0.001  -0.001 
 (1.624)  (1.631) (-0.566)  (-0.569) 
Constant 0.008  0.008 0.030  0.031 
 (0.377)  (0.371) (1.249)  (1.341) 
       
Observations 19,228  19,228 11,550  11,550 
R-squared 0.429  0.429 0.376  0.376 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Young Firms Mature Firms 




DLAYER = 1 a + b 
0.635 

















Table 12 (Cont.) 
Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
 Young Firms Mature Firms 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.818*** a 0.816*** 1.030*** a 1.004*** 
 (26.695)  (29.674) (18.995)  (20.559) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.345*** b -0.355*** -0.472*** b -0.537*** 
 (-4.392)  (-5.152) (-4.922)  (-6.406) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.006 c -0.017 -0.032* c -0.050** 
 (-0.527)  (-1.059) (-1.819)  (-2.186) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
-0.025 d -0.083* -0.061* d -0.057 
 (-0.775)  (-1.847) (-1.807)  (-1.347) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.008*  -0.026* -0.003  -0.005 
 (-1.856)  (-1.906) (-0.918)  (-0.412) 
CHANNEL 0.002  0.006 -0.000  0.003 
 (0.394)  (0.744) (-0.097)  (0.414) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.658***  1.648*** 0.688  0.710 
 (6.182)  (6.154) (1.299)  (1.345) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.023***  -0.023*** -0.018  -0.018* 
 (-3.856)  (-3.931) (-1.637)  (-1.652) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.039***  0.039*** 0.064***  0.064*** 
 (8.650)  (8.633) (8.503)  (8.503) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.184***  -0.185*** -0.322***  -0.323*** 
 (-19.421)  (-19.560) (-20.470)  (-20.598) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -0.909*  -0.879 -1.076  -1.028 
 (-1.685)  (-1.632) (-1.495)  (-1.434) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.102***  -0.102*** -0.078***  -0.079*** 
 (-7.360)  (-7.417) (-4.500)  (-4.534) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.027**  -0.026** -0.047***  -0.048*** 
 (-2.234)  (-2.213) (-3.441)  (-3.476) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.476***  0.476*** 0.618***  0.618*** 
 (19.907)  (19.888) (23.447)  (23.465) 
Constant 0.000  0.000 0.053**  0.050** 
 (0.012)  (0.019) (2.495)  (2.469) 
       
Observations 19,228  19,228 11,550  11,550 
R-squared 0.443  0.444 0.405  0.405 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Young Firms Mature Firms 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DLAYER = 0 a 
0.816 














b + d 
0.438††† 




b + d 
  0.594†††  
 c 
0.017 















Table 13  
Cross-sectional tests: Young firms versus Mature firms – Channel width 
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: Young firms versus Mature firms. 
Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost stickiness). The dependent 
variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). All other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) report the results for young firms 
(mature firms). The t-value reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Channel width analysis   
 Young Firms Mature Firms 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CCG  DCC CCG  DCC 
       
ΔSALES 0.687*** a 0.689*** 0.750*** a 0.753*** 
 (26.756)  (26.482) (20.004)  (19.695) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.273*** b -0.075*** -0.294*** b -0.055*** 
 (-11.842)  (-7.881) (-8.293)  (-4.259) 
CHANNEL -0.016  0.007* -0.026**  -0.008** 
 (-1.388)  (1.829) (-2.105)  (-2.206) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.468***  1.475*** 0.957***  0.855** 
 (6.201)  (6.211) (2.734)  (2.438) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.075***  -0.076*** -0.073***  -0.069*** 
 (-13.928)  (-14.128) (-9.048)  (-8.636) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.024***  0.024*** 0.040***  0.042*** 
 (5.353)  (5.327) (6.318)  (6.563) 
GROWTH 0.110  0.117 0.334***  0.351*** 
 (1.191)  (1.255) (3.495)  (3.667) 
ASSET 0.036***  0.036*** 0.030***  0.031*** 
 (11.884)  (11.973) (9.733)  (9.833) 
EMPLOYEE 0.004*  0.003 -0.001  -0.001 
 (1.706)  (1.593) (-0.270)  (-0.521) 
Constant 0.011  0.002 0.036  0.039 
 (0.514)  (0.104) (1.545)  (1.644) 
       
Observations 19,228  19,228 11,550  11,550 
R-squared 0.435  0.431 0.379  0.376 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Young Firms Mature Firms    




   
DCC = 1 a + b 
0.614 
a + b 
0.698 


















Table 13 (Cont.) 
Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
  Young Firms Mature Firms  
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CCG  DCC CCG  DCC 
       
ΔSALES 0.853*** a 0.852*** 1.028*** a 1.037*** 
 (30.983)  (30.401) (21.118)  (20.915) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.408*** b -0.379*** -0.606*** b -0.627*** 
 (-5.897)  (-5.393) (-7.316)  (-7.406) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.328*** c -0.080*** -0.363*** c -0.087*** 
 (-10.594)  (-6.298) (-6.809)  (-4.338) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
0.321*** d 0.031 0.230** d 0.098*** 
 (3.702)  (0.963) (2.176)  (2.733) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.016  -0.007 -0.020  -0.002 
 (-0.577)  (-0.883) (-0.714)  (-0.355) 
CHANNEL 0.028*  0.013** 0.004  0.002 
 (1.683)  (2.397) (0.227)  (0.362) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.598***  1.641*** 0.851  0.709 
 (5.992)  (6.133) (1.618)  (1.345) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.025***  -0.024*** -0.027**  -0.023** 
 (-4.206)  (-4.130) (-2.503)  (-2.140) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.037***  0.038*** 0.063***  0.064*** 
 (8.351)  (8.382) (8.438)  (8.564) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.173***  -0.182*** -0.315***  -0.318*** 
 (-18.308)  (-19.239) (-20.091)  (-20.197) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -0.837  -0.824 -0.809  -0.736 
 (-1.561)  (-1.530) (-1.138)  (-1.033) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.101***  -0.102*** -0.075***  -0.078*** 
 (-7.347)  (-7.402) (-4.312)  (-4.475) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.025**  -0.025** -0.052***  -0.052*** 
 (-2.117)  (-2.111) (-3.802)  (-3.786) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.465***  0.473*** 0.611***  0.613*** 
 (19.526)  (19.795) (23.263)  (23.265) 
Constant -0.001  -0.008 0.048**  0.051** 
 (-0.074)  (-0.405) (2.363)  (2.486) 
       
Observations 19,228  19,228 11,550  11,550 
R-squared 0.448  0.445 0.408  0.405 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Young Firms Mature Firms 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DCC = 0 a 
0.852 














b + d 
0.348††† 


























Cross-sectional tests: Common auditors versus Non-common auditors – Channel length 
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: Common auditors versus 
Non-common auditors. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost stickiness). 
The dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) report the results for 
common auditors (non-common auditors). The t-value reported in the parentheses is calculated based 
on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Channel length analysis 
 Common Auditor Non-Common Auditor 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
SALES 0.676*** a 0.653*** 0.652*** a 0.632*** 
 (7.564)  (7.538) (13.905)  (14.353) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.045** b -0.112*** -0.021 b -0.033** 
 (-2.556)  (-3.998) (-1.623)  (-1.988) 
CHANNEL 0.005  0.003 0.007  0.013** 
 (0.704)  (0.293) (1.450)  (2.121) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.525*  1.661** 2.157***  2.159*** 
 (1.915)  (2.088) (5.614)  (5.619) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.035*  -0.034* -0.058***  -0.057*** 
 (-1.767)  (-1.712) (-6.670)  (-6.575) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.022  0.022 0.033***  0.033*** 
 (1.492)  (1.507) (4.501)  (4.483) 
GROWTH 0.096  0.094 0.547***  0.550*** 
 (0.411)  (0.408) (4.297)  (4.322) 
ASSET 0.053***  0.054*** 0.036***  0.035*** 
 (6.758)  (6.901) (9.344)  (9.297) 
EMPLOYEE -0.005  -0.005 -0.006**  -0.007** 
 (-0.906)  (-0.923) (-2.197)  (-2.204) 
Constant 0.071  0.075 -0.040  -0.035 
 (1.379)  (1.485) (-1.289)  (-1.144) 
       
Observations 2,167  2,167 7,575  7,575 
R-squared 0.421  0.424 0.382  0.382 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Common Auditor Non-Common Auditor  





DLAYER = 1 a + b 
0.541 


















Table 14 (Cont.)        
Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
 Common Auditor Non-Common Auditor 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.963*** a 0.938*** 0.772*** a 0.770*** 
 (9.346)  (9.404) (13.621)  (14.480) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.641*** b -0.673*** -0.144 b -0.199* 
 (-2.765)  (-3.173) (-1.186)  (-1.813) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.050** c -0.088** -0.025 c -0.032 
 (-2.256)  (-2.169) (-1.332)  (-1.314) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
-0.037 d -0.004 -0.055 d -0.058 
 (-0.612)  (-0.043) (-1.457)  (-1.132) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.013*  0.003 -0.015***  -0.010 
 (-1.650)  (0.155) (-3.040)  (-0.681) 
CHANNEL 0.007  0.003 0.009  0.011 
 (0.814)  (0.229) (1.381)  (1.228) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES -0.240  -0.174 2.925***  2.820*** 
 (-0.212)  (-0.154) (5.139)  (4.959) 
ASSET x ΔSALES 0.069***  0.066*** 0.002  -0.001 
 (3.071)  (2.966) (0.199)  (-0.063) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.040***  0.040*** 0.036***  0.037*** 
 (2.621)  (2.646) (4.484)  (4.604) 
SUCCESS xΔSALES -0.316***  -0.314*** -0.283***  -0.286*** 
 (-10.729)  (-10.591) (-17.296)  (-17.540) 
GROWTH_INTERACT 1.259  1.331 -3.168***  -2.929*** 
 (0.751)  (0.796) (-3.740)  (-3.467) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.268***  -0.274*** -0.103***  -0.104*** 
 (-5.944)  (-6.122) (-5.161)  (-5.163) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.070**  -0.072** 0.006  0.005 
 (-2.001)  (-2.055) (0.362)  (0.280) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.530***  0.523*** 0.608***  0.608*** 
 (8.659)  (8.509) (18.631)  (18.668) 
Constant 0.091**  0.094** 0.008  0.012 
 (2.266)  (2.410) (0.319)  (0.466) 
       
Observations 2,167  2,167 7,575  7,575 
R-squared 0.459  0.459 0.414  0.413 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Common Auditor Non-Common Auditor 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DLAYER = 0 a 
0.938 














b + d 
0.677††† 
























Cross-sectional tests: Firms with confirming signals versus Firms with no confirming signals   
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: Firms with confirming signals versus 
Firms with no confirming signals. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost 
stickiness). The dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). 
All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) report the 
results for Firms with confirming signals (Firms with no confirming signals). The t-value reported in 
the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Channel length analysis   
 Confirming Signals No Confirming Signals 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.761*** a 0.726*** 0.642*** a 0.644*** 
 (24.517)  (25.093) (18.746)  (20.686) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.034*** b -0.049*** 0.000 b -0.017 
 (-3.745)  (-4.074) (0.011)  (-1.119) 
CHANNEL 0.002  0.005 -0.003  -0.002 
 (0.582)  (0.938) (-0.626)  (-0.316) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.591***  1.598*** 0.928***  0.935*** 
 (6.472)  (6.507) (3.047)  (3.069) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.069***  -0.069*** -0.084***  -0.083*** 
 (-11.245)  (-11.305) (-12.663)  (-12.609) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.037***  0.036*** 0.023***  0.023*** 
 (7.263)  (7.166) (4.277)  (4.238) 
GROWTH 0.152*  0.155* 0.279***  0.280*** 
 (1.662)  (1.696) (2.719)  (2.726) 
ASSET 0.043***  0.042*** 0.028***  0.028*** 
 (13.255)  (13.236) (8.574)  (8.553) 
EMPLOYEE 0.001  0.002 0.005**  0.005** 
 (0.646)  (0.686) (2.408)  (2.406) 
Constant 0.021  0.023 0.023  0.020 
 (0.893)  (1.015) (0.941)  (0.825) 
       
Observations 16,497  16,497 14,281  14,281 
R-squared 0.442  0.442 0.377  0.377 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Confirming Signals No Confirming Signals  





DLAYER = 1 a + b 
0.677 


















Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
 Confirming Signals No Confirming Signals 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.937*** a 0.905*** 0.804*** a 0.832*** 
 (30.344)  (32.269) (18.161)  (21.176) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.485*** b -0.480*** -0.320*** b -0.399*** 
 (-4.927)  (-5.454) (-3.814)  (-5.562) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.034*** c -0.055*** 0.023 c 0.026 
 (-3.101)  (-3.716) (1.289)  (1.067) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
-0.004 d -0.021 -0.082** d -0.116** 
 (-0.125)  (-0.429) (-2.175)  (-2.546) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.004  -0.018 -0.002  0.002 
 (-0.771)  (-1.143) (-0.528)  (0.145) 
CHANNEL 0.005  0.010 -0.008  -0.013 
 (0.950)  (1.542) (-1.295)  (-1.305) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.647***  1.656*** 1.460***  1.436*** 
 (5.870)  (5.913) (3.758)  (3.696) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.001  -0.001 -0.051***  -0.051*** 
 (-0.109)  (-0.154) (-5.888)  (-5.949) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.050***  0.049*** 0.042***  0.042*** 
 (11.196)  (11.112) (6.396)  (6.399) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.201***  -0.202*** -0.211***  -0.212*** 
 (-22.092)  (-22.199) (-14.648)  (-14.784) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -0.680  -0.694 -1.392**  -1.358** 
 (-1.117)  (-1.142) (-2.227)  (-2.173) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.175***  -0.175*** -0.042***  -0.042*** 
 (-9.786)  (-9.852) (-2.831)  (-2.817) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.044***  -0.044*** -0.034***  -0.034*** 
 (-2.883)  (-2.879) (-2.786)  (-2.785) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.484***  0.484*** 0.517***  0.517*** 
 (16.341)  (16.325) (21.038)  (21.084) 
Constant 0.015  0.019 0.016  0.007 
 (0.739)  (0.954) (0.741)  (0.351) 
       
Observations 16,497  16,497 14,281  14,281 
R-squared 0.460  0.460 0.394  0.394 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Confirming Signals No Confirming Signals 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DLAYER = 0 a 
0.905 














b + d 
-0.501††† 























Cross-sectional tests: High competition versus Low competition   
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: High competition versus Low 
competition. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost stickiness). The 
dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs (ΔSG&A). All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) report the results for 
firms operating in competitive industry (firms operating in less competitive industry). The t-value 
reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Channel length analysis   
 High Competition Low Competition 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.712*** a 0.689*** 0.684*** a 0.666*** 
 (21.727)  (22.227) (22.183)  (23.949) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.025*** b -0.044*** -0.018 b -0.027* 
 (-2.636)  (-3.555) (-1.597)  (-1.954) 
CHANNEL 0.003  0.008* -0.003  -0.005 
 (0.742)  (1.659) (-0.766)  (-0.904) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.406***  1.402*** 1.003***  1.017*** 
 (5.058)  (5.045) (3.795)  (3.851) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.042***  -0.042*** -0.096***  -0.096*** 
 (-6.372)  (-6.331) (-16.267)  (-16.272) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.030***  0.030*** 0.026***  0.026*** 
 (5.601)  (5.521) (5.387)  (5.346) 
GROWTH 0.653***  0.659*** -0.207**  -0.207** 
 (6.723)  (6.787) (-2.151)  (-2.146) 
ASSET 0.044***  0.044*** 0.028***  0.028*** 
 (14.229)  (14.136) (8.571)  (8.572) 
EMPLOYEE 0.009***  0.009*** -0.001  -0.001 
 (4.191)  (4.220) (-0.479)  (-0.487) 
Constant 0.049  0.053 0.024  0.021 
 (0.402)  (0.431) (1.259)  (1.118) 
       
Observations 14,708  14,708 16,070  16,070 
R-squared 0.465  0.465 0.399  0.399 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 High Competition Low Competition  





DLAYER = 1 a + b 
0.645 


















Table 16  
Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
 High Competition Low Competition 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 SGA  SGA SGA  SGA 
       
ΔSALES 0.981*** a 0.961*** 0.807*** a 0.805*** 
 (26.180)  (27.586) (22.680)  (25.947) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.580*** b -0.585*** -0.269*** b -0.325*** 
 (-6.700)  (-7.481) (-3.221)  (-4.552) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.028** c -0.045*** -0.003 c -0.012 
 (-2.324)  (-2.651) (-0.183)  (-0.609) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
-0.019 d -0.051 -0.058 d -0.077* 
 (-0.616)  (-1.190) (-1.606)  (-1.707) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.008**  -0.015 -0.002  -0.010 
 (-2.053)  (-1.250) (-0.450)  (-0.772) 
CHANNEL 0.006  0.012* -0.007  -0.007 
 (1.323)  (1.659) (-1.174)  (-0.823) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 2.447***  2.418*** 0.507  0.514 
 (7.407)  (7.336) (1.573)  (1.596) 
ASSET x ΔSALES 0.011  0.010 -0.051***  -0.051*** 
 (1.619)  (1.486) (-7.179)  (-7.204) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.064***  0.064*** 0.032***  0.032*** 
 (11.453)  (11.428) (6.307)  (6.276) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.209***  -0.210*** -0.197***  -0.197*** 
 (-19.273)  (-19.450) (-17.225)  (-17.289) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -3.662***  -3.640*** 1.043*  1.041* 
 (-5.882)  (-5.856) (1.838)  (1.837) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.109***  -0.109*** -0.071***  -0.071*** 
 (-6.748)  (-6.772) (-4.972)  (-4.978) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.069***  -0.069*** -0.012  -0.012 
 (-5.123)  (-5.122) (-1.036)  (-1.041) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.503***  0.503*** 0.485***  0.485*** 
 (19.813)  (19.814) (19.469)  (19.465) 
       
Constant -0.022  0.033 0.033**  0.026* 
 (-0.187)  (0.280) (2.052)  (1.756) 
       
Observations 14,708  14,708 16,070  16,070 
R-squared 0.481  0.481 0.415  0.415 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 High Competition Low Competition 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DLAYER = 0 a 
0.961 














b + d 
-0.636††† 




























Cross-sectional tests: High margin versus Low margin   
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: Firms with high profit margin versus 
Firms with low profit margin. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost 
stickiness). The dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs 
(ΔSG&A). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) 
report the results for firms with high profit margin (firms with low profit margin). The t-value 
reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Channel length analysis   
 High Margin Low Margin 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.936***  0.895*** 0.559***  0.558*** 
 (31.136)  (31.849) (16.142)  (17.539) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.041***  -0.057*** -0.003  -0.018 
 (-4.281)  (-4.701) (-0.303)  (-1.247) 
CHANNEL 0.006  0.009* -0.006  -0.004 
 (1.545)  (1.853) (-1.208)  (-0.771) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.024***  1.053*** 1.582***  1.576*** 
 (4.036)  (4.155) (5.364)  (5.346) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.090***  -0.089*** -0.058***  -0.058*** 
 (-13.925)  (-13.859) (-9.385)  (-9.369) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.058***  0.058*** 0.015***  0.015*** 
 (12.139)  (12.101) (2.644)  (2.630) 
GROWTH 0.166*  0.167* 0.349***  0.353*** 
 (1.932)  (1.942) (3.184)  (3.222) 
ASSET 0.041***  0.041*** 0.034***  0.034*** 
 (13.304)  (13.262) (10.051)  (10.011) 
EMPLOYEE -0.002  -0.002 0.007***  0.007*** 
 (-1.052)  (-1.053) (2.945)  (2.936) 
Constant -0.020  -0.014 0.045  0.039 
 (-1.013)  (-0.740) (1.531)  (1.342) 
       
Observations 16,539  16,539 14,239  14,239 
R-squared 0.473  0.473 0.376  0.376 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 High Margin Low Margin  





DLAYER = 1 a + b 
0.838 

















Table 17  
Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
 High Margin Low Margin 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 1.023*** a 0.976*** 0.768*** a 0.795*** 
 (33.855)  (35.968) (17.570)  (20.029) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.365*** b -0.320*** -0.279*** b -0.384*** 
 (-3.824)  (-3.736) (-3.291)  (-5.190) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.050*** c -0.067*** 0.026* c 0.023 
 (-4.363)  (-4.397) (1.688)  (1.048) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
0.027 d 0.021 -0.106*** d -0.143*** 
 (0.750)  (0.423) (-3.160)  (-3.210) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.005  -0.008 0.001  -0.000 
 (-1.355)  (-0.652) (0.210)  (-0.029) 
CHANNEL 0.012***  0.016*** -0.018***  -0.021** 
 (2.794)  (2.665) (-2.783)  (-2.099) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.122***  1.149*** 2.346***  2.356*** 
 (4.242)  (4.356) (5.905)  (5.934) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.025***  -0.025*** -0.006  -0.006 
 (-3.805)  (-3.819) (-0.845)  (-0.793) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.061***  0.061*** 0.037***  0.037*** 
 (14.049)  (14.014) (5.729)  (5.736) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.155***  -0.156*** -0.256***  -0.256*** 
 (-16.932)  (-17.050) (-18.744)  (-18.794) 
GROWTH_INTERACT 0.463  0.434 -2.454***  -2.471*** 
 (0.709)  (0.665) (-4.076)  (-4.110) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.139***  -0.142*** -0.105***  -0.105*** 
 (-7.773)  (-7.940) (-7.313)  (-7.302) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.026*  -0.025* -0.029**  -0.029** 
 (-1.826)  (-1.767) (-2.292)  (-2.312) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.431***  0.429*** 0.559***  0.558*** 
 (14.414)  (14.335) (22.716)  (22.723) 
Constant -0.001  0.010 0.035  0.018 
 (-0.076)  (0.618) (1.322)  (0.683) 
       
Observations 16,539  16,539 14,239  14,239 
R-squared 0.482  0.482 0.398  0.398 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 High Margin Low Margin 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DLAYER = 0 a 
0.976 














b + d 
-0.299†† 



























Table 18  
Robustness tests: Channel length analysis 
This table reports the results from tests of the impact of bullwhip effect on cost responsiveness using 
alternative industry layer measure. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost 
stickiness). The dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs 
(ΔSG&A). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) reports the results 
when industry layer is measured by raw (CILAYER) and binary (DILAYER) respectively. The 
t-value reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Channel length analysis   
 (1)  (2) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER 
    
ΔSALES 0.731*** a 0.721*** 
 (44.571)  (47.550) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.002** b -0.014*** 
 (-2.465)  (-2.609) 
CHANNEL 0.001***  0.010*** 
 (2.787)  (5.058) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 2.504***  2.513*** 
 (17.768)  (17.826) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.053***  -0.054*** 
 (-18.549)  (-18.593) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.041***  0.041*** 
 (16.949)  (17.014) 
GROWTH 0.768***  0.777*** 
 (15.230)  (15.396) 
ASSET 0.036***  0.036*** 
 (24.502)  (24.523) 
EMPLOYEE -0.003***  -0.003*** 
 (-2.656)  (-2.678) 
Constant -0.054**  -0.052** 
 (-2.324)  (-2.225) 
    
Observations 53,933  53,933 
R-squared 0.437  0.437 
Industry FE YES  YES 
 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
IND_LAYER = 0    a  0.721 
IND_LAYER = 1   a + b  ___0.707___ 
Difference b  0.014††† 













Table 18 (Cont.)   
Panel B: Cost stickiness 
 (1)  (2) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER 
    
ΔSALES 0.828*** a 0.824*** 
 (44.344)  (48.810) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.299*** b -0.280*** 
 (-6.681)  (-6.982) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.003** c -0.020*** 
 (-2.253)  (-2.817) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x ΔSALES 0.001 d -0.002 
 (0.497)  (-0.111) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.002***  -0.013*** 
 (-5.072)  (-3.404) 
CHANNEL 0.001***  0.012*** 
 (3.148)  (4.579) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 3.680***  3.671*** 
 (20.944)  (20.893) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.003  -0.003 
 (-0.910)  (-1.093) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.044***  0.045*** 
 (18.227)  (18.356) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.248***  -0.250*** 
 (-43.557)  (-43.878) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -3.871***  -3.828*** 
 (-12.649)  (-12.505) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.106***  -0.107*** 
 (-14.343)  (-14.466) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.019***  -0.019*** 
 (-3.025)  (-3.013) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.542***  0.542*** 
 (40.140)  (40.241) 
Constant 0.017  0.020 
 (0.775)  (0.931) 
    
Observations 53,933  53,933 
R-squared 0.458  0.458 
Industry FE YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Sales Increase Sales Decrease Difference 
IND_LAYER = 0  a a + b b 
 0.824 0.544 0.280††† 
IND_LAYER = 1  a + c  a + b + c + d   b + d 
 ___0.804_ __0.522_ 0.282††† 
 
Difference 
c     
-0.020††† 
c + d     
-0.022 









Table 19  
Cross-sectional tests: Manufacturing firms versus Non-manufacturing firms   
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: Manufacturing firms versus 
Non-manufacturing firms. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost 
stickiness). The dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs 
(ΔSG&A). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) 
report the results for Manufacturing firms (Non-manufacturing firms). The t-value reported in the 
parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Channel length analysis   
 Manufacturing Firms Non-Manufacturing Firms 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.674*** a 0.651*** 0.725*** a 0.716*** 
 (24.008)  (24.356) (19.015)  (20.744) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.023*** b -0.035*** -0.011 b -0.029* 
 (-2.802)  (-3.265) (-0.810)  (-1.680) 
CHANNEL 0.002  0.004 -0.007  -0.006 
 (0.552)  (1.091) (-1.086)  (-0.777) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.447***  1.453*** 1.232***  1.238*** 
 (6.241)  (6.269) (3.745)  (3.768) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.070***  -0.070*** -0.075***  -0.075*** 
 (-10.583)  (-10.552) (-11.049)  (-11.029) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.024***  0.024*** 0.035***  0.035*** 
 (4.978)  (4.901) (6.013)  (5.979) 
GROWTH 0.307***  0.308*** 0.164  0.166 
 (4.090)  (4.111) (1.229)  (1.246) 
ASSET 0.046***  0.046*** 0.026***  0.026*** 
 (16.077)  (16.024) (7.127)  (7.089) 
EMPLOYEE 0.008***  0.008*** -0.001  -0.001 
 (4.435)  (4.455) (-0.365)  (-0.354) 
Constant 0.074***  0.076*** 0.015  0.008 
 (3.713)  (3.836) (0.660)  (0.375) 
       
Observations 19,820  19,820 10,958  10,958 
R-squared 0.463  0.463 0.383  0.383 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Manufacturing Firms Non-Manufacturing Firms  





DLAYER = 1 a + b 
0.616 



















Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
 Manufacturing Firms Non-Manufacturing Firms 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CLAYER  DLAYER CLAYER  DLAYER 
       
ΔSALES 0.898*** a 0.887*** 0.861*** a 0.852*** 
 (27.913)  (29.585) (19.968)  (22.616) 
DECREASE  xΔSALES -0.425*** b -0.471*** -0.341*** b -0.334*** 
 (-5.843)  (-7.143) (-3.201)  (-3.661) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.015 c -0.016 -0.014 c -0.047* 
 (-1.406)  (-1.088) (-0.776)  (-1.935) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
-0.061** d -0.118*** 0.006 d 0.014 
 (-2.390)  (-3.389) (0.131)  (0.236) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE -0.005*  -0.011 -0.004  -0.021 
 (-1.711)  (-1.110) (-0.592)  (-1.031) 
CHANNEL 0.000  -0.000 -0.003  0.005 
 (0.043)  (-0.044) (-0.423)  (0.472) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 2.033***  2.022*** 1.266***  1.280*** 
 (7.228)  (7.205) (3.232)  (3.275) 
ASSET x ΔSALES 0.005  0.004 -0.035***  -0.035*** 
 (0.748)  (0.608) (-4.437)  (-4.468) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.047***  0.047*** 0.045***  0.044*** 
 (9.385)  (9.399) (7.536)  (7.501) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.233***  -0.234*** -0.171***  -0.171*** 
 (-25.000)  (-25.171) (-12.259)  (-12.309) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -1.976***  -1.952*** -0.719  -0.748 
 (-3.924)  (-3.881) (-0.990)  (-1.032) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.153***  -0.153*** -0.069***  -0.069*** 
 (-9.940)  (-9.992) (-4.147)  (-4.134) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.042***  -0.042*** -0.020  -0.020 
 (-3.572)  (-3.565) (-1.376)  (-1.355) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.530***  0.529*** 0.462***  0.462*** 
 (25.426)  (25.425) (14.444)  (14.451) 
Constant 0.016  0.015 0.025  0.019 
 (0.928)  (0.896) (1.259)  (1.109) 
       
Observations 19,820  19,820 10,958  10,958 
R-squared 0.483  0.483 0.395  0.395 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Manufacturing Firms Non-Manufacturing Firms 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DLAYER = 0 a 
0.887 














b + d 
0.589††† 
























Cross-sectional tests: Manufacturing firms versus Non-manufacturing firms   
This table reports the results for cross-sectional analysis tests: Manufacturing firms versus 
Non-manufacturing firms. Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for cost responsiveness (cost 
stickiness). The dependent variable is a change variable of selling and administrative costs 
(ΔSG&A). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) and (2) (Column (3) and (4)) 
report the results for Manufacturing firms (Non-manufacturing firms). The t-value reported in the 
parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
 
Panel A: Channel width analysis   
 Manufacturing Firms Non-Manufacturing Firms 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CCG  DCC CCG  DCC 
       
ΔSALES 0.694*** a 0.693*** 0.741*** a 0.735*** 
 (25.905)  (25.574) (21.489)  (20.957) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.312*** b -0.079*** -0.238*** b -0.049*** 
 (-13.273)  (-8.865) (-7.591)  (-3.665) 
CHANNEL 0.008  0.003 -0.054***  -0.003 
 (0.760)  (1.092) (-3.372)  (-0.633) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 1.614***  1.529*** 1.217***  1.249*** 
 (6.990)  (6.606) (3.720)  (3.804) 
ASSET x ΔSALES -0.073***  -0.073*** -0.076***  -0.076*** 
 (-11.207)  (-11.238) (-11.273)  (-11.213) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.026***  0.025*** 0.033***  0.034*** 
 (5.457)  (5.188) (5.791)  (5.894) 
GROWTH 0.274***  0.282*** 0.149  0.163 
 (3.676)  (3.764) (1.120)  (1.225) 
ASSET 0.046***  0.046*** 0.026***  0.026*** 
 (16.214)  (16.273) (7.060)  (7.122) 
EMPLOYEE 0.008***  0.008*** -0.001  -0.001 
 (4.634)  (4.508) (-0.439)  (-0.406) 
Constant 0.078***  0.076*** 0.014  0.007 
 (3.960)  (3.822) (0.640)  (0.329) 
       
Observations 19,820  19,820 10,958  10,958 
R-squared 0.468  0.465 0.388  0.384 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Manufacturing Firms Non-Manufacturing Firms  





DCC = 1 a + b 
0.614 


















Panel B: Cost stickiness analysis 
 Manufacturing Firms Non-Manufacturing 
Firms 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
 CCG  DCC CCG  DCC 
       
ΔSALES 0.937*** a 0.937*** 0.874*** a 0.870*** 
 (31.112)  (30.618) (23.209)  (22.700) 
DECREASE x ΔSALES -0.546*** b -0.532*** -0.353*** b -0.346*** 
 (-8.247)  (-7.919) (-3.864)  (-3.725) 
CHANNEL x ΔSALES -0.361*** c -0.087*** -0.284*** c -0.061*** 
 (-11.554)  (-7.173) (-6.366)  (-3.334) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE x 
ΔSALES 
0.353*** d 0.052* 0.166 d 0.036 
 (4.456)  (1.887) (1.404)  (0.840) 
CHANNEL x DECREASE 0.001  -0.002 -0.035  -0.009 
 (0.063)  (-0.404) (-0.890)  (-0.790) 
CHANNEL 0.037***  0.006 -0.013  0.007 
 (2.608)  (1.568) (-0.536)  (0.857) 
GROWTH x ΔSALES 2.128***  2.016*** 1.145***  1.274*** 
 (7.604)  (7.190) (2.939)  (3.259) 
ASSET x ΔSALES 0.001  0.002 -0.038***  -0.036*** 
 (0.187)  (0.284) (-4.839)  (-4.622) 
EMPLOYEE x ΔSALES 0.049***  0.048*** 0.042***  0.043*** 
 (9.844)  (9.610) (7.075)  (7.309) 
SUCCESS x ΔSALES -0.223***  -0.232*** -0.159***  -0.167*** 
 (-23.909)  (-24.871) (-11.399)  (-11.980) 
GROWTH_INTERACT -1.960***  -1.797*** -0.602  -0.729 
 (-3.913)  (-3.572) (-0.836)  (-1.008) 
ASSET_INTERACT -0.155***  -0.156*** -0.065***  -0.068*** 
 (-10.184)  (-10.239) (-3.935)  (-4.085) 
EMPLOYEE_INTERACT -0.043***  -0.043*** -0.017  -0.019 
 (-3.678)  (-3.635) (-1.170)  (-1.279) 
SUCCESS_INTERACT 0.519***  0.526*** 0.450***  0.460*** 
 (24.975)  (25.268) (14.117)  (14.348) 
Constant 0.009  0.010 0.023  0.016 
 (0.550)  (0.613) (1.325)  (0.924) 
       
Observations 19,820  19,820 10,958  10,958 
R-squared 0.487  0.485 0.400  0.396 
Industry FE YES  YES YES  YES 
 
†††, †† and † denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Manufacturing Firms Non-Manufacturing Firms 
 Increase Decrease Difference Increase Decrease Difference 
DCC = 0 a 
0.937 














b + d 
-0.480††† 
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PART III SUPPLY CHAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND AUDIT QUALITY  
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter empirically test the association between industry homogeneity 
between supplier firms and their principal customers and audit fee. Using a sample 
of non-financial U.S. firms between 2002-2012, I demonstrate that auditors are able 
to develop cost savings from audit clients who are in the same industry with their 
principal customers. I posit that auditors could infer risks from understanding the 
material relationships between auditees and their principal customers. The 
knowledge could guide auditors in performing risk assessment and audit procedures. 
The results in this study show that auditors are able to generate cost reductions from 
industry homogenous clients. In addition, I perform the tests on two sub-samples: (1) 
industry expert and (2) non-expert samples to check if auditors are willing to share 
the cost savings to their industry homogenous auditees. The results indicates that 






Previous fee studies suggest that auditors could be benefited from audit 
technology and knowhow arising from auditor sharing (e.g. Johnstone, 2012) and 
industry specialization (e.g. Craswell et al., 1995; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). 
Related sources of auditor competency remained unexplored include how auditors 
benefits from understanding the auditees’s environment. This study aims to bridge 
this gap by studying the pricing and audit quality impacts of understanding its 
principal customers concentrated from the same industry (hereafter is called industry 
homogeneity). Specifically, I aim to investigate if auditors could be benefited from 
industry homogenous clients, and they are willing to pass the cost reductions arising 
from effective and efficient engagement to their clients. 
I focus on studying auditees’ material relationships with principal customers for 
two reasons. First, auditors could gain entity-specific knowledge (e.g. the business 
model, the economic and industry outlook), which serves as an important input for 
audit planning. Second, auditors could identify red flags from industry homogenous 
customers of the auditees. Auditors could assess the risk of material misstatement at 




efficient the planning of the audit engagement. 
The purpose of this study is based on a call from the International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). They develop an exposure draft of ISA 315 
(revised) addressing the issues: “(1) Public interest issued addressed in ED-315, (2) 
Understanding the entity and its environment, (3) Understanding the entity’s system 
of internal control, (4) Identifying and assessing the risks of material misstatement; 
and (5) Conforming and consequential amendments (IAASB, 2018)”. My research 
question is mainly motivated by the second area11.  
In particular, I plan to examine the pricing and audit quality implications of 
understanding industry homogenous principal customers. First, it is ex-ante not clear 
how the understanding of the entity contributes to auditors’ efforts and quality. 
Second, the willingness to share the cost reductions to auditees is also not clear to us. 
On one hand, auditors have incentives to share the cost savings from efficient audit 
to clients (Simunic, 1980). On the other hand, they may continue to charge a fee 
premium for signaling purpose. Thus, it is an empirical question which is worth 
investigating.  
                                                     
11 The practitioner question that: “why the understanding is required to be obtained and how the 




In this study, I define industry homogeneity as the extent to which auditees and 
their principal customers are concentrated from the same industry. Intuitively, 
auditors could exert less effort from industry homogenous engagement as the 
knowledge obtained from the business models serves as an important input of audit 
planning and scope of engagement. This leads me to allege that auditors could exert 
less effort in industry homogenous auditees’ engagement. Accordingly, I conjecture 
that there is a negative association between industry homogeneity and audit pricing. 
Next, generic competitive strategies are used to categorize the positioning of 
industry expert and non-expert auditors (Porter, 1985). The former refers to the audit 
firms which outperform other rivalries by providing highly differentiated services in 
exchange for fee premium, while the latter refers to the audit firms which secure the 
market position by undercutting the audit fees. This theory leads me to conjecture 
that industry expert auditors are reluctant to share the cost savings for signaling 
purpose, and incentive to recoup prior investment in the client-specific industry. 
Industry homogeneity is operationalized as SAME_INDUSTRY, which measures 
the extent of industry homogeneity between auditees and their principal customers. 




1 if auditee i and its principal customer j are from the same industry and 0 otherwise. 
Second, I calculate the sales ratio by dividing the sales to each individual customer 
by total sales. Third, I multiply the sales ratio of each customer with the binary 
variable (SAME). Then, I sum the weighted binary variable for each auditee. A high 
value of SAME_INDUSTRY indicates that the regulatory and industry environments 
of the auditees and their principal customers look alike. 
The research setting is in the United States, which provides an ideal setting for 
testing the hypotheses12. Using a sample of 9,561 auditee-year observations from 
2002 – 2012, I find that auditors are able to develop cost savings from industry 
homogenous clients, suggesting that understanding of business models is important 
in guiding the planning and execution of an audit. Next, the results in sub-sample 
analyses reveal that divergent pricing practices are exhibited by industry expert 
auditors (at both city level, national level and joint level) and non-expert auditors. 
Specifically, I find that auditors are willing to share the cost savings with auditees, 
except the expert auditors, revealing that market leaders in the audit market are more 
                                                     
12 Listed firms in the United States are required to disclose the identities of its principal customers 
who contribute to its total revenue by more than 10%. This allows me to construct a measure of 




willing to retain the audit cost savings.  
Next, my attention turns to the alternative explanation of audit fee reduction, as 
this may reflect the auditors exert less effort onto the engagement. To address this 
concern, I perform two analyses to check if the audit quality and financial reporting 
quality of industry homogenous clients are scarified. The results based on subsequent 
restatement and accrual based measures rule out the alternative explanation. 
Therefore, there is no trade-off between auditor effort and audit quality. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it highlights 
the practical usefulness of understanding an auditee’s business models, including 
their principal customers as it helps the auditors develop competency. To my best 
knowledge, this is one of the first study addressing the pricing and audit quality 
implications of understanding the business model of the auditees. Second, the 
findings complement to the literature by showing the divergent pricing behavior 
exhibited by audit market leaders. This could enrich our understanding in the pricing 






The rest of this study is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature 
review and theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the research methodology. 


















2. Hypothesis Development and Literature Review 
2.1 Understanding on an entity 
According to International Standards on Auditing 315, auditors are required to 
obtained an understanding of the entity at the planning stage (IASB, 2012). They 
have to obtain knowledge pertaining to an auditees’ business model (e.g. operation 
cycle, business risks), industry environment (e.g. relationship with principal 
suppliers and customers, industry life cycle) and macro-environment (e.g. general 
economic conditions) through inquiries. This serves as a blueprint of the audit 
engagement, which could guide auditors in performing risk assessment and audit 
procedures. 
By understanding the major customers of the auditees which are concentrated in 
the same industry, auditors are able to understand the entity thoroughly and revise 
the audit planning accordingly. First, auditors could rely on the information and red 
flags obtained from their principal customers (e.g. economic development and 
industry outlook) to revise the scope of audit planning. Second, auditors could base 
on the knowledge obtained from industry homogenous customers to identify the 




(e.g. seasonal pattern), trading terms (e.g. market price of commodities) and 
reporting requirement help auditors in determining if accounting choices are 
appropriately selected and consistent with the industry practices.  
The knowledge overlap between auditees and their principal customers could 
help auditors in the planning and execution of the audit engagement. First, the 
knowledge overlap enables auditors to revise the scope of audit planning when 
deemed necessary. Second, an exhaustive understanding of an entity helps the 
auditors to direct their efforts and time to selected areas for further investigations. 
Without such overlapped knowledge, auditors are not able to assess the audit risks 
accurately and design appropriate audit strategies to address those risks and audit 
matters. 
The aforementioned discussion suggests that auditors could obtain better 
knowledge from their industry homogenous clients, which could help the auditors 
complete the engagement effectively and efficiently. As audit fee is a function of 
auditors’ effort (Simunic, 1980), I conjecture that auditors could charge a lower fee 
on industry homogenous auditees. Accordingly, there should be a negative 






2.2 Industry Specialization 
Audit quality varies across individual auditors due to the competency of the 
auditor (e.g. Craswell et al., 1995; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). This line of studies 
document that industry specialists could accumulate knowledge and develop audit 
knowhow based on the clientele from the same industry (e.g. Cairney and Young, 
2006). Therefore, knowledge obtained from the industry is transferrable to other 
engagement, which helps the auditors to complete the engagement in an effective 
and efficient manner. 
According to Defond and Zhang (2015), industry specialists, who have a higher 
reputational capital at stake, have an incentive to provide the audit services at high 
quality. In return, they are able to charge incremental higher fee to the auditees. For 
example, Craswell et al. (1995) find that audit market leaders in Australia are able to 
earn incremental fee premium by 34%. In addition, industry specialists at both 





national and city level are able to charge audit fee premiums in exchange for 
differentiated audit services (e.g. Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Francis et al., 2005).  
Given the industry specialists’ incentive to charge high price, cost savings do 
not necessarily lead to an audit fee cut as reflected in previous fee studies. For 
example, Gong et al. (2016) find that auditor shared by acquirer and acquiree are 
able to complete the audit efficiently, but continue to charge high price for the 
post-acquisition engagement. However, Johnstone et al. (2014) find that auditors 
shared by supply chain firms are willing to share the cost savings arising from 
knowledge spillover with auditees. The mixed evidence may suggest that the audit 
pricing decision is affected by a combination of cost factors (e.g. audit hours) and 
non-cost factors (e.g. reputational concerns). 
The concepts of generic competitive strategies are used to describe the ways in 
which a firm could outperform the others in the marketplace through cost leadership 
or differentiation (Porter, 1985). The former refers to a firm leverage on its (audit) 
technology and knowhow to achieve cost advantages. The audit cost leader could 
strengthen its competitiveness by setting a fee lower than its competitors. The latter 




In return, “it is rewarded for its uniqueness with a premium price (Porter, 1985, 
p.14)”. Therefore, auditors are not necessarily share the cost savings with the 
auditees.  
This aforementioned discussion leads me to contend that audit cost leaders are 
more willing to share the cost savings arising from efficient audit to industry 
homogenous auditees. On the other hand, industry specialists are more willing to 
retain the cost savings as they have an incentive to recoup the investment in 
industry-based clientele (Craswell, 1995) and provide high quality assurance services 
(Defond and Zhang, 2015). This line of argument will be transformed in the next 
pairs of hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: For audit cost leaders, there is negative association between 
industry homogeneity and audit fee. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: For industry specialists, there is non-negative association 




3. Research design and methodology 
3.1 Model specification 
 An audit fee model is developed to test the first hypothesis (H1) which 
examines if auditors spend less efforts in industry homogenous clients.  
 
In regression (1), the dependent variable of regression is audit fee, which is a proxy 
of auditors’ efforts. It is measured as the logarithm transformation of audit fees 
charged on auditee i in year t (logFEE). The variable of interest is industry 
homogeneity between supplier firm and its principal customers (SAME_INDUSTRY). 
To construct this variable, I firstly calculate a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if 
both auditee i and its major customer j are from the same industry based on 2-digit 
SIC codes and 0 otherwise13. Second, I calculate a sales ratio which is equal to the 
sales to each respective customer divided by the total sales. Third, I multiply the 
                                                     
13 In the case the major customers are not disclosed, the undisclosed customer will be excluded. In 
addition, I also measure SAME_INDUSTRY) based on 1-digit SIC codes and fama-macbeth codes.  
logFEEit =   β0 + β1SAME_INDUSTRYit + β2 EXPERTit + β3 BIG4it  
+ β4 BUSY_SEASONit + β5 ASSETSit + β6 LONG_DEBTit  
+ β7 CURRENT_DEBTit + β8 INVENTORYit + β9 ROAit  
+ β10 LOSSit + β11 STD_CFOit + β12 SALES_GROWTHit  
+ β13 RESTRUCTUREit + β14 SPECIALit  
+ β15 FOREIGNit + β16 RDit + β17 TENUREit  






sales ratio for each respective customers with the binary industry homogeneity 
variable. Fourth, I sum the weighted homogeneity variables by auditee14. Here is a 
real example. For firm gvkey-coded as “2615”, it has three major customers, one is 
not from the same SIC industry and the other two are from the same industry with 
the sales ratio 0.086, 0.091 and 0.04 respectively. The SAME_INDUSTRY is equal to 
0.130 which is equal to 0 x 0.086 + 1 x 0.091 + 1 x 0.04.    
A set of control variables are included in regression (1) to control the potential 
influences of auditors on audit pricing. First, a binary variable of (BIG4) is included 
to control its potential influence on audit pricing. Second, a binary measure of 
industry experts is incorporated in the model (EXPERT). This measure takes three 
different forms, which is equal to 1 if auditors has the largest market share at (1) 
metropolitan statistical areas level (hereafter is called city level); (2) national level; 
and (3) both city and national level; and 0 otherwise. Third, a binary measure of 
common auditor is incorporated to control the confounding knowledge spillover 
effect, which is equal to 1 if auditee share an auditor with any one of its principal 
customers; and 0 otherwise. 
                                                     
14 A high value of SAME_INDUSTRY indicates that auditee and its principal customers are industry 




A battery of control variables is included to control the influence of audit 
complexity on audit fees. First, an indicator variable of peak season (BUSY_SEASON) 
is inserted, which is equal to 1 if the financial year-end fall on 31 December, and 0 
otherwise. Second, binary variables (RESTRUCTURE, SPECIAL and FOREIGN) are 
included, which is equal to 1 if restructure expenses, special items and foreign 
income or loss are reported, and 0 otherwise. Third, a research and development 
variable (RD) is added, which is equal to the research and development expense 
incurred in the current year divided by the sales in the same year. 
A set of firm-level variables is included to control the potential influence of size, 
risk and growth on audit pricing. First, a battery of measures is inserted to control the 
potential influence of size. The first one is total assets (ASSETS), which is equal to 
total assets scaled by sales in year t. The second one is inventory variable 
(INVENTORY), which is measured by total inventory divided by total assets in year t. 
The third one is return on assets (ROA), which is equal to net income divided by total 
assets. Second, a set of variables are included to control the influence of risks on 
audit pricing, including solvency ratio (LONG_DEBT) and current ratio 




assets, while the latter is measured by current liabilities divided by current assets. I 
also included the standard deviation of operating cash flows (STD_CFO). Third, 
SALES_GROWTH is incorporated to control its potential influence on auditors’ effort. 
Finally, I insert TENURE, which is measured by the number of audit tenure, to 
control the potential influence of auditors independence on auditors’ effort. 
Definitions of key variables are summarized in Appendix A.  
Hypothesis 1 lead me to conjecture that auditors could exert less efforts on 
industry homogenous clients. Therefore, I predict the coefficient of 
SAME_INDUSTRY is negative as it reflects the auditors are willing and able to 
generate cost savings and pass it to the industry homogeneity auditees. 
 
[INSERT APPENDIX A] 
 
To test if there are potential different effect on pricing arrangement, I perform 
regression (1) on sub-samples bisected by expert variables. Expert variables take 
three forms, which is equal to 1 if auditors have the largest market share at national 




SAME_INDUSTRY is negative (non-negative) for (audit marker followers) audit 
market leaders.  
 
3.2 Sample selection 
The sample formation procedures are summarized in table 1. The sample period 
starts with 2002 to avoid the potential impact of Aurther Anderson. The initial 
sample consists of 26,935 supplier-year observations from 2002 to 2012. After 
deleting the observation in the financial industry (SIC 6000 – 6799) and regulated 
industry (SIC 4800-4999), I further exclude the observations not covered by the 
Audit Analytics. Next, I delete observations with missing financial variables. The 
final sample consists of 9,561 firm-year observations, of which 4,406 (2,026) firms 
use city-level (national-level) industry experts and 5,155 (7,535) firms use city-level 
(national-level) non-expert auditors.  
 






4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics on both untransformed and regression 
variables. For untransformed variable, the mean of audit fee (FEE) is $1,441,748. 
For regression variables, the mean of logFEE is 13.28. The variable of interest 
(SAME_INDUSTRY) has a mean value of 0.23 and median value of 0, indicating that 
on average the sample firms have principal customers diversified in various 
industries. In addition, 46.08% (21.19%) of the sample firms employs city-level 
(national-level) industry specialist experts. Moreover, around 13.10% of firm-year 
observations restates its earnings and the absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
0.08. 
The descriptive statistics of the control variables are summarized here. For the 
size variables, the mean value of ASSETS, INVENTORY and ROA are 5.47, 0.11 and 
-0.08 respectively. For the risk variables, the means of LONG_DEBT, 
CURRENT_DEBT and STD_CFO are 0.152, 0.284 and 0.096 respectively. For the 
growth variables, the average of SALES_GROWTH and MB are 0.15 and 2.53 




special items, foreign operation and research and development in the income 
statement. Overall, the statistics are compatible with prior auditing research using 
COMPUSTAT Segment Filing (e.g. Johnstone et al., 2012). 
 
[INSERT TABLE TWO HERE] 
 
4.2 Audit fee analysis 
 To test the first hypothesis, I run regression (1) on the whole sample and the 
results are reported in table 4. In column 1, the baseline results reveal that auditors 
could exert less efforts and time in industry homogenous client which is reflected by 
a negative coefficient of SAME_INDUSTRY. This may also indicate that auditors are 
able to pass the cost savings to industry homogenous clients. With regard to the 
economic significance, one standard deviation increase in SAME_INDUSTRY leads 
to a decrease in audit fee by 3.25%15. Given the sample mean of FEE is $1,441,748, 
the cost savings is equivalent to $46,857, which is economically significant.  
                                                     
15 The fee reduction is calculated by [e(coefficient) *(mean) - e(coefficient) *(mean + standard deviation)]/ [e(coefficient) *(mean)], 
which represents the change effect of one standard deviation change in SAME_INDUSTRY on the 
percentage change in audit fee. Given the coefficient of SAME_INDUSTRY is -0.084 (See Table 4) 
and its mean and standard deviation are 0.226 and 0.393 respectively (See Table 2), the reduction in 




Next, EXPERT variable is inserted to the regression to control its potential 
influences on audit pricing. The results of regression (1) after adding city-level, 
national-level and join experts are reported in columns (2), (3) and (4) respectively. 
As the coefficients of SAME_INDUSTRY are all significantly negative, this indicates 
that on average, auditors are able to generate cost savings and willing to pass it to 
industry homogenous auditees. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported.  
 
[INSERT TABLE FOUR HERE] 
 
4.3 Industry Specialist and Audit Fee analyses 
To test the second hypotheses, regression (1) are re-run on sub-sample bisected 
by EXPERT variables and the results are reported in table 5. In column (1) and (2), 
the results on sub-samples with and without using city-level industry expert auditors 
are summarized. I continue to find auditors could exert less effort in industry 
homogenous clients in the non-expert sample. The result is missed when regression 
(1) is run on expert sample. This may suggest that industry expert auditors are 




 Column (3) and (4) reports the results of the sub-sample analysis based on a 
sub-sample with and without employing nation-level industry expert auditor. I 
consistently find that national-level expert auditors are not willing to share the cost 
savings with their industry homogenous clients, but not for non-market leaders. In 
column (5) and (6), the results are qualitatively the same. I find that market leaders at 
both MSA and national level continue to charge fee premium for their clients 
whereas non-market leaders are able to share the quasi-rent with clients. 
Collectively, the results suggest that divergent audit pricing behavior are 
exhibited by market leader and market follower. For market followers (cost leaders), 
they are able to translate the cost savings arising from industry homogenous clients 
into audit fee discounts. For market leaders (differentiators), they continue to charge 
fee premium in exchange for unique assurance services. Therefore, both hypotheses 
2a and 2b are supported.  
 






4.4 Additional analyses 
 The following model is used to rule out the alternative explanation related to 
reductions in audit fee:   
 
The dependent variable of regression (2) is audit quality (AUDIT_QUALITY), which 
is measured in two different ways. First, audit quality is measured by subsequent 
restatement. RESTATEMENT is equal to 1 if there are any subsequent restatement of 
current earnings due to GAAP violation, and 0 otherwise. Second, it is proxied by 
accrual-based measure (ABS_DAC), which is equal to the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. To do this, I follow Jones’s (1991) model to estimate the 
residual terms of the following equation: 
 
The definitions of control variables are included here. First, I calculate the total 
accruals (TACC) by deducting the depreciation from the change of net current assets. 
AUDIT_QUALITYit =   β0 + β1SAME_INDUSTRYit + β2 EXPERTit + β3 BIG4it  
+ β4 TACCit + β5 ASSETSit + β6 LEVERAGEit + β7 ROAit 
+ β8 LOSSit+ β9 MBit + β10 SALES_GROWTHit + β11 RDit  
+ β12 LITIGATIONit + β13 ZSCOREit + β14 TENUREit  
+ INDUSTRY + YEAR + ε 
- (2) 




Second, I calculate the leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) by dividing the total liabilities 
by total equity. Third, I include a loss indicator (LOSS), which is equal to 1 if net loss 
is reported in year t and 0 otherwise. Fourth, I measure market-to-book ratio (MB) 
by dividing the market value of equity by its book value. Finally, I include the 
ZSCORE as a measure of firm’s financial health.  
 
[INSERT APPENDIX A] 
 
4.4.1 Audit quality measured by subsequent restatement 
 The results on audit quality analysis measured by subsequent restatement are 
reported in table 6. In column (1), I find that for all sample firms there is no 
association between industry homogeneity and subsequent restatement. Next, I 
perform the sub-sample analyses by re-running regression two on sub-sample 
bisected by the expert variables (at MSA level, at nation level, or both). The results 
reported in column (4) and (6) find consistent results to support that there is no 





 [INSERT TABLE SIX HERE] 
 
4.4.2 Audit quality measured by accrual-based measure 
 Next, I replace the audit quality variable with accrual-based measure to examine 
the potential impacts on financial reporting quality. The results of the multi-variate 
analysis is reported in table 7. In column (1), I find that there is no association of 
SAME_INDUSTRY and ABS_DAC. Next, I run the regression two on our 
sub-samples. In column (2) and (3), I find no evidence that the financial reporting 
quality is scarified in the city-level expert samples. SAME_INDUSTRY does not 
differ across sample (chi-square = 0.37). In column (4) and (5), I consistently find 
SAME_INDUSTRY is not significantly associated with a higher absolute amount of 
ABS_DAC with chi-square equal to 0.32 in the national-level expert samples. In 
column (6) and (7), I find consistent result to support there is no impairment of 
financial reporting quality for joint expert samples with insignificant difference of 
SAME_INDUSTRY (chi-square = 1.18). Collectively, the results based on 
restatements and accrual based measure show that fee reduction is not associated 




The evidence lends support to show that the undercut of audit fee is a natural 
outcome of efficient engagement. Therefore, the alternative explanation is dispelled.  
 
 [INSERT TABLE SEVEN HERE] 
 
4.5 Robustness check 
 Lastly, I check if the results still hold when using the alternative measures of the 
industry homogeneity. To do this, I measure industry variables based on two different 
industry classifications. First, I re-code SAME_INDUSTRY based on SIC one-digit 
level. Second, I also re-code SAME_INDUSTRY based on Fama French industry 
classification. The un-tabulated results reveal that SAME_INDUSTRY is negatively 







 This study examines if the industry homogeneity of audit clients and their major 
customers influence auditors in performing the audit risk assessments and the 
associated audit procedures. Using a sample of U.S. firms between 2002 and 2012, I 
find that auditors could exert less effort on engagements in which audit clients and 
their major customers are in the same industry. In addition, I find that the willing to 
share the cost savings to audit clients depends on the positioning of the auditor. 
Particularly, I find that industry expert auditors do not undercut audit fee as a result 
of cost reductions. These pieces of findings deepen our understanding of the audit 
practice in the following ways. First, it documents the practical usefulness of 
understanding the entity’s principal customers and their environment. Second, it 
demonstrates the difference of audit pricing practice exhibited by industry experts 
and non-experts auditors.  
Before closing, the following caveats are summarized. First, I am not able to 
use other audit quality measures such as audit reporting lags to test the research 
questions as our sample of U.S. listed firms are subjected to the same filing deadline 




understanding how practitioners perceive the importance of understanding the 
auditees’ major customers. I conclude with suggestions for future research 


















Appendix A  
Variable definitions 
Dependent Variable  
AUDITOR_EFFORT 







Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if there is restatement and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Absolute value of discretionary accrual generated from modified 
Jones model (1991). 
  
Independent Variables 
SAME_INDUSTRY The sum of weighted average of SAME for all major customers firms 
for supplier firm in year t 
 
SAME Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if the supplier firm and its major 
customer firm j are in the same industry and 0 otherwise.  
 
EXPERT Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if the auditor has the highest 







Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if an auditor is shared by ther 
supplier firm and one of its principal customers; and 0 otherwise 
 
Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if auditors are one of the big four 
CPA firms and 0 otherwise. 
 
BUSY_SEASON Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if the fiscal year end falls on 31st 
December and 0 otherwise. 
 
ASSETS Total assets divided by sales in year t. 
 
LONG_DEBT Long-term debt-to-Assets ratio, which is equal to long-term debt 
divided by total assets 
 
CURRENT_DEBT Current ratio, which is equal to current liabilities divided by total 
assets 
 








STD_CFO The standard deviation of operating cash flows in the past four years 
 
LOSS Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if there is net loss and 0 
otherwise 
 
SALES_GROWTH Changes in sales ratio, which is equal to sales in year t divided by 
sales in year t-1 
 




restructuring expenses and 0 otherwise 
 
SPECIAL Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if the company reports any 
special item and 0 otherwise 
 
FOREIGN Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if the company reports any 
foreign income and 0 otherwise 
 
RD Research and development expenses divided by sales  
 
TENURE Logarithmic transformation of the number of years the incumbent 
auditors has audited the company’s financial statement.   
 
TACC Total accruals divided by total assets   
  




Market-to-book ratios, which is equal to the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity 
   
LITIGATION Binary variable, which is equal to 1 if firm is in high risks industry, 
including biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail and 0 
otherwise (Reichelt and Wang 2010) 
 
ZSCORE The likelihood of company survival, which is equal to: 
  1.2 x [(current assets-current liabilities)/total assets] 
+ 1.4 x (retained earnings/total assets)  
+ 3.3 x (Earnings before interest and tax/total assets)  
+ 0.6 x (market value of equity/total liabilities)  
+ 1.0 (sales/total assets)                  
(Altman, 1983) 

































This table presents the sample selection procedures for the audit pricing and audit quality 
analyses.    
 
Procedures 
 Number of 
Observations 
Supplier-customers year observations available in the Compustat 




Supplier-year observations available in the Compustat Segment 




Less:    
    Observations in financial industry and regulated industry    522 
    Observations with missing financial variables   554 
   






Descriptive Statistics (N =5,643) 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the raw and transformed variables. The sample period 
is from 2003 to 2010. All variables are winsorized at their 1% and 99% values. 






FEE (Raw value)  $1,441,748 $2,757,797 $612,500 $238,000 $1,480,0
00 
logFEE 13.275     1.347    13.313 12.367 14.195 
SAME_INDUSTRY 0.226 0.393 0 0 0.333 
EXPERT 0.453 0.498 0 0 1.000 
BIG4 0.700 0.458 1.000 0 1.000 
BUSY_SEASON 0.655 0.475 1.000 0 1.000 
ASSETS 5.473 2.091 5.401 4.014 6.928 
LONG_DEBT 0.152 0.211 0.063 0 0.240 
CURRENT_DEBT 0.284 0.326 0.207 0.131 0.327 
INVENTORY 0.112 0.115 0.080 0.012 0.172 
ROA -0.084 0.369 0.023 -0.105 0.072 
LOSS 0.408 0.492 0 0 1.000 
STD_CFO 0.096 0.154 0.052 0.029 0.096 
SALES_GROWTH 0.145 0.461 0.077 -0.051 0.226 
RESTRUCTURE 0.027 0.162 0 0 0 
SPECIAL 0.004 0.061 0 0 0 
FOREIGN 0.306 0.461 0 0 1.000 
RD 0.231 0.836 0.021 0 0.158 
TENURE 1.502 0.722 1.609 1.099 2.079 
RESTATEMENT 0.131 0.338 0 0 0 
ABS_DAC 0.080 0.105 0.049 0.022 0.098 
TACC -0.042 0.103 -0.039 -0.083 0.001 
LEVERAGE 0.525 0.525 0.437 0.252 0.632 
MB 2.534 1.916 1.916 1.119 3.278 
LITIGATION 0.412 0.492 0 0 1.000 






Table 3  
Correlation Matrix  
This table summarizes the Pearson correlation matrix (N =5,643) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  (5) 
(1) logFEE - 
 
    
(2) RESTATEMENT 0.035 
0.001 


































Table 4  
Estimate for auditor fee analysis  
This table reports the results from tests of the effect of industry homogeneity on auditor efforts. The 
dependent variable is logFEE. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-value reported in 
the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  EXPERT 
VARIABLES  City National Joint 
     
SAME_INDUSTRY -0.084*** -0.082** -0.083*** -0.084*** 
 (-2.650) (-2.571) (-2.622) (-2.635) 
EXPERT - 0.060*** 0.076*** 0.114*** 
  (5.023) (5.409) (7.157) 
BIG4 0.352*** 0.336*** 0.335*** 0.338*** 
 (21.702) (20.357) (20.360) (20.741) 
COMMONAUDITOR -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 
 (-0.195) (-0.225) (-0.404) (-0.289) 
BUSY_SEASON 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 (7.005) (7.110) (6.985) (6.997) 
logAT 0.513*** 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.510*** 
 (130.436) (129.365) (130.061) (129.466) 
LONG_DEBT 0.042 0.039 0.044 0.044 
 (1.559) (1.462) (1.629) (1.628) 
CURRENT_DEBT 0.415*** 0.412*** 0.415*** 0.417*** 
 (16.590) (16.467) (16.615) (16.689) 
INVENTORY 0.215*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.218*** 
 (3.521) (3.558) (3.591) (3.570) 
ROA -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.154*** 
 (-7.758) (-7.822) (-7.702) (-7.647) 
LOSS 0.142*** 0.144*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 (10.595) (10.693) (10.498) (10.528) 
STD_CFO 0.065 0.066 0.062 0.057 
 (1.243) (1.277) (1.200) (1.101) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (-3.761) (-3.774) (-3.769) (-3.723) 
RESTRUCTURE 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.180*** 0.182*** 
 (5.360) (5.410) (5.227) (5.280) 
SPECIAL_ITEM 0.276** 0.289** 0.278** 0.294** 
 (2.328) (2.443) (2.350) (2.489) 
FOREIGN 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 
 (12.649) (12.696) (12.656) (12.578) 
RD -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** 
 (-4.149) (-4.163) (-4.115) (-4.077) 
TENURE 0.026** 0.024** 0.024** 0.024** 
 (2.446) (2.252) (2.234) (2.218) 
Constant 8.354*** 8.297*** 8.383*** 8.386*** 
 (15.727) (15.637) (15.805) (15.829) 
Observations 9,561 9,561 9,561 9,561 
R-squared 0.838 0.839 0.839 0.839 




Table 5  
Sub-sample analyses  
This table reports the results from sub-sample tests of the effect of industry homogeneity on auditor efforts. The dependent variable is logFEE. All other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The t-value reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
 City-Level Expert National-level Expert Joint Expert 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Yes No Yes No Yes No 
       
SAME_INDUSTRY 0.001 -0.131*** -0.051 -0.086** 0.027 -0.086** 
 (0.017) (-3.082) (-0.705) (-2.447) (0.314) (-2.536) 
BIG4 0.465*** 0.320*** 0.032 0.335*** 0.044 0.341*** 
 (16.131) (15.299) (0.294) (19.028) (0.354) (19.984) 
COMMONAUDITOR 0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 0.028 -0.007 
 (0.380) (-0.421) (-0.384) (-0.423) (0.973) (-0.493) 
BUSY_SEASON 0.053*** 0.124*** 0.067*** 0.092*** 0.050 0.094*** 
 (3.043) (7.565) (2.597) (6.832) (1.616) (7.232) 
logAT 0.525*** 0.490*** 0.520*** 0.510*** 0.530*** 0.506*** 
 (98.773) (83.571) (62.467) (114.119) (54.798) (116.875) 
LONG_DEBT 0.108*** 0.027 0.100* 0.027 0.164** 0.034 
 (2.748) (0.729) (1.727) (0.898) (2.374) (1.157) 
CURRENT_DEBT 0.641*** 0.320*** 0.915*** 0.370*** 0.988*** 0.377*** 
 (14.184) (10.588) (11.556) (13.926) (10.326) (14.443) 
INVENTORY 0.342*** 0.119 0.005 0.240*** 0.350** 0.196*** 
 (3.611) (1.498) (0.038) (3.539) (2.037) (2.990) 
ROA -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.113** -0.168*** -0.162** -0.162*** 
 (-4.221) (-6.355) (-2.032) (-7.783) (-2.545) (-7.638) 
LOSS 0.121*** 0.147*** 0.088*** 0.148*** 0.074** 0.147*** 




STD_CFO 0.128 0.004 0.487*** 0.029 0.631*** 0.025 
 (1.329) (0.071) (3.365) (0.524) (3.544) (0.458) 
SALE_GROWTH -0.074*** -0.027* -0.031 -0.049*** -0.045 -0.044*** 
 (-3.832) (-1.690) (-1.119) (-3.532) (-1.315) (-3.265) 
RESTRUCTURE 0.094** 0.275*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.108 0.196*** 
 (2.007) (5.556) (2.695) (4.197) (1.537) (5.025) 
SPECIAL_ITEM 0.273 0.259* -0.013 0.393*** 0.077 0.299** 
 (1.295) (1.818) (-0.055) (2.841) (0.205) (2.403) 
FOREIGN 0.157*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 0.161*** 0.142*** 0.163*** 
 (8.852) (9.045) (6.312) (10.813) (4.659) (11.444) 
RD -0.015 -0.045*** -0.020 -0.038*** -0.042* -0.036*** 
 (-1.158) (-4.227) (-1.033) (-4.214) (-1.717) (-4.135) 
TENURE 0.049*** 0.012 -0.011 0.023* 0.013 0.020* 
 (2.872) (0.882) (-0.385) (1.948) (0.381) (1.808) 
Constant 8.317*** 9.476*** 8.616*** 8.482*** 9.833*** 8.421*** 
 (16.395) (57.609) (47.426) (15.873) (38.487) (15.783) 
       
Observations 4,406 5,155 2,026 7,535 1,404 8,157 
R-squared 0.856 0.808 0.840 0.835 0.859 0.831 









Estimate for audit quality analysis 
This table reports the results from tests of the effect of industry homogeneity on auditor quality. The dependent variable is RESTATEMENT. All other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. The t-value reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
 All firms City-Level Expert National-level Expert Joint Expert 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES  Yes No Yes No Yes No 
        
SAME_INDUSTRY -0.067 0.244 -0.196 0.057 -0.085 0.737 -0.187 
 (-0.346) (0.760) (-0.777) (0.129) (-0.387) (1.289) (-0.888) 
EXPERT -0.005       
 (-0.074)       
COMMONAUDITOR -0.157** -0.183* -0.148 -0.075 -0.248*** -0.006 -0.231*** 
 (-2.043) (-1.735) (-1.281) (-0.505) (-2.649) (-0.029) (-2.678) 
BIG4 -0.342*** -0.131 -0.400*** -1.403** -0.279*** -1.090 -0.286*** 
 (-3.524) (-0.714) (-3.257) (-2.395) (-2.688) (-1.348) (-2.862) 
logAT 0.141*** 0.163*** 0.123*** 0.102** 0.142*** 0.139** 0.143*** 
 (6.822) (5.464) (4.027) (2.261) (6.001) (2.446) (6.319) 
LEVERAGE 0.109 0.198 0.051 0.721*** 0.020 0.126 0.094 
 (1.186) (1.105) (0.466) (2.845) (0.191) (0.355) (0.972) 
ROA -0.045 -0.228 0.071 0.151 -0.104 -0.440 -0.021 
 (-0.375) (-1.020) (0.482) (0.408) (-0.794) (-1.094) (-0.163) 
LOSS 0.371*** 0.432*** 0.335*** 0.154 0.397*** -0.009 0.394*** 
 (4.841) (3.628) (3.220) (0.863) (4.577) (-0.041) (4.770) 
MB -0.003 -0.011 0.004 -0.012 0.000 -0.020 -0.000 
 (-0.449) (-1.050) (0.478) (-0.869) (0.032) (-1.033) (-0.048) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.197*** 0.059 0.266*** 0.028 0.231*** -0.214 0.234*** 




RD -0.102* -0.289** -0.037 -0.078 -0.104 -0.372 -0.077 
 (-1.760) (-2.186) (-0.575) (-0.548) (-1.633) (-1.388) (-1.321) 
LITIGATION 0.266** 0.039 0.428*** -0.134 0.353*** -0.522 0.387*** 
 (2.345) (0.217) (2.850) (-0.523) (2.756) (-1.554) (3.158) 
ZSCORE 0.001 0.015 -0.005 0.004 0.001 0.015 -0.001 
 (0.160) (1.546) (-0.833) (0.321) (0.114) (0.881) (-0.178) 
TENURE 0.208*** 0.166 0.267*** 0.472** 0.174** 0.373 0.216*** 
 (3.108) (1.467) (3.126) (2.350) (2.420) (1.456) (3.066) 
        
Constant -13.468 -14.033 -2.220*** -2.179* -13.318 -2.736* -12.917 
 (-0.021) (-0.029) (-2.944) (-1.872) (-0.027) (-1.645) (-0.026) 
        
Observations 9,489 4,362 5,054 1,941 7,481 1,321 8,095 





Estimate for financial reporting quality analysis  
This table reports the results from tests of the effect of industry homogeneity on financial reporting quality. The dependent variable is discretionary accruals. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. The t-value reported in the parentheses is calculated based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
 All firms City-Level Expert National-level Expert Joint Expert 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES  Yes No Yes No Yes No 
        
SAME_INDUSTRY -0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.004 -0.014 -0.001 
 (-0.548) (0.245) (-0.613) (0.263) (-0.582) (-1.338) (-0.118) 
EXPERT -0.002       
 (-0.748)       
COMMONAUDITOR 0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.909) (1.506) (0.066) (-0.149) (0.849) (0.204) (0.851) 
BIG4 -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.005 0.040*** -0.010*** 0.034*** -0.009*** 
 (-2.957) (-2.884) (-1.340) (3.577) (-2.911) (3.030) (-2.609) 
logAT -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.005*** -0.011*** 
 (-14.660) (-10.456) (-10.306) (-5.882) (-13.672) (-3.691) (-14.382) 
LEVERAGE 0.060*** 0.036*** 0.068*** 0.031*** 0.062*** 0.007 0.063*** 
 (8.819) (5.453) (7.492) (2.772) (8.199) (0.827) (8.655) 
ROA -0.016** 0.002 -0.021** -0.005 -0.016* -0.001 -0.016* 
 (-2.076) (0.222) (-2.064) (-0.509) (-1.818) (-0.138) (-1.840) 
LOSS -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003 
 (-1.199) (-0.459) (-0.324) (0.599) (-1.103) (-0.002) (-0.926) 
MB 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 
 (2.758) (1.552) (2.347) (1.050) (2.672) (1.260) (2.569) 




 (7.352) (5.479) (5.496) (3.582) (6.725) (2.550) (7.015) 
RD -0.003* 0.002 -0.006*** -0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.003* 
 (-1.777) (0.619) (-2.884) (-1.493) (-1.394) (0.400) (-1.681) 
LITIGATION 0.003 0.007* 0.002 0.015*** 0.001 0.014** 0.002 
 (0.797) (1.749) (0.271) (2.837) (0.135) (2.368) (0.395) 
ZSCORE -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
 (-0.069) (-1.318) (0.514) (-0.754) (-0.092) (-1.698) (0.012) 
TENURE -0.003 -0.006* -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.008* -0.003 
 (-1.374) (-1.777) (-0.664) (-1.503) (-0.943) (-1.691) (-1.102) 
Constant 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.050** 0.066*** 0.063** 0.058*** 
 (4.798) (6.097) (3.063) (2.204) (4.773) (2.551) (3.930) 
        
Observations 9,561 4,406 5,155 2,026 7,535 1,404 8,157 
R-squared 0.226 0.157 0.264 0.135 0.242 0.126 0.239 
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PART IV DISCUSSIONS 
1. Summary of the thesis 
Prior studies infer the supply chain variations from major customer disclosure to 
examine how information can assist different market constituents in making 
decisions. Despite this, research on its importance from the perspectives of managers 
and auditors are relatively scarce. Therefore, my thesis bridges this gap by 
examining how supply chain variations influence firms’ cost management decision 
and audit process. In the first essay, I find that channel length is negatively 
associated with SG&A elasticity, which is consistent with the notion that the longer 
the layer of intermediaries in the supply chain, the greater the noises in the demand 
signals which restrain firms from making responsive cost adjustment. I also find that 
SG&A elasticity decrease with channel width, suggesting that firms with narrower 
base of customer are reluctant to adjust the capacity responsively for the sake of 
recouping the relationship specific investment. Overall, the essay provides the first 
economic-based study to show the impact of supply chain variations on SG&A 
elasticity.  




major customers influence auditors in performing the audit risk assessment and the 
audit work. I find that auditors are able to exert less efforts on industry homogenous 
engagements. However, the willing to share the cost savings depends on the auditor 
positioning. I find that audit market leaders (differentiators) are more likely to retain 
the cost savings while audit market followers (cost leaders) are willing to share the 
quasi-rent with their clients in forms of a fee cut. The results of the audit pricing 








 The findings of my first essay extend the literature by linking the bullwhip 
literature to a topic in cost accounting. Despite that there is a growing interests in this 
topic, we know very little about the implication of bullwhip effect of cost 
management. I respond to a call for more archival research using the evidence from 
channel characteristics by shedding light on the potential effect on the channel length 
and channel width on SG&A elasticity. This research should provide new insights to 
practitioners and researchers in understanding the implications of supply chain 
dynamic and highlight the importance of data integrations in reducing the potential 
impacts of bullwhip effect on cost management.  
In my second essay, the results contribute to the literature by demonstrating the 
practical usefulness of understanding the auditees’ business model. This is one of the 
first supply-side study to address the pricing and audit quality implications of 
industry homogeneity between auditees and their major customers. Results of this 
study should be to practitioners, especially in light of the enactment of the revised 
auditing standard 315. In addition, the results also enrich our understanding of the 








3. Limitation and future extensions 
An important limitation of my thesis is the potential measurement errors. First, 
the firms contained in COMPUSTAT Segment Filing are a sub-set of total population, 
which contains around 25% of all listed firms in the U.S. Second, I acknowledge that 
the data limitation may induce measurement errors for our channel variables 
(CLAYER, CCG and SAME_INDUSTRY) as the data for firms’ non-major customers 
is not publicly available. Therefore, readers should be cautious in interpreting the 
results.  
The findings in my thesis suggest several avenues for future research. First, 
future research may explore the potential different effects on cost management using 
the distance data between channel members. Second, future research may consider 
replicate my findings in another setting to identify cross-country difference in SG&A 
elasticity. Third, other research approach (e.g. survey) may be used in future studies 
to identify the practical usefulness of understanding of the auditees’ principal 
customers.  
